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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to 78-2(a)-3(2)(h) and (j) of the 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATUTES 
30-3-5(3) The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, 
and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court, Judge William Bohling, Presiding. 
Appellant is appealing a decision by the lower court, grating judgment to the Plaintiff for 
the fair market value for two parcels of land that should have been conveyed to Plaintiff 
by Defendant, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, but which she had already conveyed to 
her sister, by warranty deed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The original divorce was granted pursuant to Stipulation before Judge John 
Rokich. A Verified Petition to Modify Decree was heard by Judge William Bohling. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court granted judgment to the Plaintiff in the sum of $106,200.00 for two 
parcels of land which should have been conveyed to Plaintiff by Defendant, and two shot 
iii 
guns which the Defendant sold, which should have been delivered to the Plaintiff. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Appellee argues that this whole appeal is without merit and not asserted in good 
faith, and therefore he is entitled to all of his costs and attorneys fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
The parties stipulated to the Plaintiff being awarded the two parcels in North Salt 
Lake, and then each side did a set of FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS and DECREE, 
regarding the awarding of the subject property, each signed by Judge Rokich. Appelant's 
claim that the Decree of Divorce does not so award the Plaintiff the said properties is 
wholly without any merit, and even if it had merit, it would have had to be the subject of 
an appeal from Judge Rokich's final order in 1992, not by way of appealing Judge 
Bohling's final order in 1996. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
The claim that the finding that the Defendant had negotiated in bad faith is without 
merit. She had conveyed the two parcels to her sister two months before she agreed in 
open Court that they would go to Plaintiff. She never disclosed the hidden deeds, until it 
was time to make good on her promise in open Court. Her negotiations in the hall, 
resulting in Plaintiff being awarded the two parcels was a total scam, and Plaintiff ended 
up paying both his own attorney for these efforts to settle the case before Judge Rokich as 
well as her Attorney for his efforts as well to settle the case before Judge Rokich. 
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ARGUMENT THREE 
The award of attorneys fees to the Plaintiff for the efforts before Judge Bohling 
were clearly appropriate. Judge Bohlings order that she pay the attorneys fees for just the 
part of the scam pulled by the Defendant is inadequate however, and this Court should 
consider not only awarding to the Respondent all of his costs and attorneys fees on 
appeal, but just compensation for all of the costs and attorneys fees generated by her 
illegal (against a restraining order) and deceptive actions. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
There was no evidence contrary to the evidence adduced from the 
Plaintiff/Respondent. Defendant/Appellant took the stand, along with the Plaintiff, 
however, she admitted that she did not either know at the time what had occurred in 
reference to the parties purchasing the subject two parcels, or that she could not 
remember the same. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
The claim that the Finding of Fact by Judge Bohling that the two parcels were 
marital property was not supported by sufficient findings is without merit, as he merely 
restated Judge Rokich's findings, which were stipulated to by the parties back in 1991. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
The lower Court did not exceed it discretion in awarding the Plaintiff the fair 
market value of the property taken and diverted by the Defendant, as the Court has 
continuing jurisdiction in the matter to do what is reasonable and necessary. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On July 6, 1990, Plaintiff, David Costanzo, filed for Divorce, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, District Court Judge Presiding. (Record at 000001) 
2. On August 1, 1990, Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim, and in paragraph #7, stated as follows: 
That during the marriage the parties acquired an interest in real property located in 
North Salt Lake. Plaintiff should be awarded the entire interest subject to paying 
Defendant one-half of the value of said interest, which is to take place no later 
than thirty (30) days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce. (Record at 
000028) 
3. In the Prayer for Relief, Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, asked for the payment of 
her half of the marital interest in the said property to be paid to her in three days. Note 
the Record at page 000030: 
D. For a decree that the interest in the real property located in North Salt Lake, 
Utah, be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to the plaintiff paying defendant one-half 
of the value of said interest which is to take place no later than three (3) days 
following the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
4. On August 17, 1990, Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, filed a MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE, TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, and therein stated in the 
preamble: (Note Record at 000033 and 000034) 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through her Attorney Harry Caston and 
herewith moves the Court for an Order granting the Defendant temporary 
possession of the marital residence located at 1141 North Capistrano Drive, Salt 
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Lake City, Utah, and restraining the Plaintiff from entering and or coming about 
the residence and that the Plaintiff be refrained from annoying, threatening, or 
harassing the Defendant, and further that the Plaintiff be restrained from 
alienating, selling, transferring or disposing of any marital property including the 
assets of Western States Coating and Painting Company, Inc., and for an Order 
requiring the Plaintiff to appear before the Court on a date certain then and there to 
show cause why: 
#6. That during the pendency of this action Plaintiff should not be restrained from 
alienating, transferring or selling any property belonging to Western States 
Coatings and Painting Company, Inc., without prior Court approval. 
#7. That during the pendency of this action both parties should not be restrained 
from alienating, selling or transferring any marital property. 
5. On August 17, 1990, the Honorable John Rokich, District Court Judge, signed 
the Defendant's Temporary Restraining Order, as follows: 
On the 17th day of August, 1990, at the hour of 11:30 o'clock a.m. came on to be 
heard Defendant's ex parte application for Temporary Order of Possession of the 
Marital Residence located at 1141 North Capistrano, Temporary Restraining Order 
and Order to Show Cause granting the Defendant temporary use of the parties 
marital residence, restraining the Defendant from entering and/or coming about the 
residence and that the Plaintiff be restrained from annoying, threatening, harassing 
the Defendant, and further that the Plaintiff be restrained from alienating, selling, 
transferring, or in any way disposing of any marital property and/or the assets of 
Western States Coatings and Painting Company, Inc. (Note the Record at page 
000052) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Court that the same application be and the 
same is hereby granted. The Defendant is hereby awarded the temporary use and 
possession of the parties marital residence and the Plaintiff is hereby enjoined and 
restrained from entering the residence and/or coming about the Defendant and 
from threatening, annoying or harassing the Defendant, and further from 
alienating, selling transferring or otherwise disposing of any marital property 
including any assets of the business known as Western States Coatings and 
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Painting Company, Inc. (Note Record at page 000053) 
. . . . It is further ordered that the Plaintiff be and appear before the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner. . . and then and there to show cause why: . . . 
#6. That during the pendency of this action Plaintiff should not be restrained from 
alienating, transferring or selling any property belonging to Western States 
Coatings and Painting Company, Inc., without prior Court approval. 
#7. That during the pendency of this action both parties should not be restrained 
from alienating, selling or transferring any marital property. 
6. The matter then came on for hearing before the Honorable Michael E. Evans, 
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on August 27, 1990, and pursuant to stipulation 
regarding a mutual restraining order, the Court minute entry at page 000063 of the Record 
states: 
3. Both parties restrained from jeopardizing assets to also include business 
without prior order of the Court or written approval of the parties. 
7. Thereafter, Defendant's Attorney, Harry Caston, prepared an ORDER ON 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, which states in paragraph #4, as follows: 
4. That both parties be restrained from jeopardizing any assets, including Western 
States Coating & Painting, without prior order of the Court or approval of 
opposing Counsel. (Note the Record at 000248 also 000301) 
8. On or about March 22, 1991, Defendant Shauna Costanzo, filed her financial 
declaration, and thereby declared under oath the following found at page 000111 of the 
Record: 
The Plaintiff should be awarded the real property located in North Salt Lake, Utah, 
subject to Plaintiff paying Defendant one-half of the value of said interest which is 
to take place no later than three (3) days following the entry of the Decree of 
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Divorce. 
9. On March 25, 1991, the matter came on regularly for Pre-Trial Conference 
before the Honorable Sandra Peuler, Domestic Relations Commissioner, with both parties 
present and each represented by Counsel, and the Court according to the minute entry, 
found at page 000095, states as follows: 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
SET FOR TRIAL. COMM. PROPOSES FOR SETTLEMENT: 
1. BUSINESS, HOME & UNDEVELOPED PROPERTY BE DIVIDED 
EQUALLY. 
10. The matter then comes on for trial before the Honorable John Rokich, District 
Court Judge on July 2, 1991, with both parties present and represented by the same 
counsel on Appeal. The Minute entry at 000116 reflects the following: 
THE ABOVE CASE COMES NOW ON BEFORE THE COURT FOR TRIAL, 
THE PLAINTIFF BEING PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY JOHN WALSH 
THE DEFENDANT ALSO BEING PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY 
HARRY CASTON. 
THE PARTIES HAVING PURSUED SETTLEMENT OUT OF THE 
COURTROOM, AND HAVING REACHED A STIPULATION HEREIN, SAID 
STIPULATION IS READ INTO THE RECORD BY COUNSEL FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF. THE DEFENDANT ALLOWS HER ANSWER TO BE 
WITHDRAWN AND HER DEFAULT ENTERED. THE PLAINTIFF IS 
SWORN AND EXAMINED. A DIVORCE IS GRANTED PURSUANT TO THE 
STIPULATION AS READ HEREIN, THE DIVORCE TO BECOME FINAL 
UPON ENTRY. 
11. At page 000183 of the Record is the Stipulation being read into the Record by 
Mr. Harry Caston: 
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THERE WAS SOME OTHER PROPERTY WHICH, OF COURSE, THE 
DEFENDANT HAS CLAIMED WAS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY. IT IS OUR 
AGREEMENT THAT SHOULD IT BE DETERMINED THAT THERE IS A 
MARITAL INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY OTHER THAN THE 10.7 ACRES 
AND THE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY THAT IT WOULD GO COMPLETELY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY INTEREST OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
12. At page 000185 of the Record, is Mr. Walsh, making a clarification of the 
agreement between the parties: 
MR. WALSH: THERE ARE IN OUR VIEW, JUDGE, TWO PIECES OF 
PROPERTY, AND I WANT TO BE CLEAR ON THIS ONE 
POINT; TWO PIECES OF PROPERTY IN ADDITION TO THE 
10.7 ACRES IN NORTH SALT LAKE AND THE MARITAL 
RESIDENCE WHICH MY CLIENT CLAIMS THERE IS AN 
INTEREST EITHER IN HIMSELF, THE TWO OF THEM, OR IN 
THE DEFENDANT BY HERSELF; AND IT'S THE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT 
WHATEVER INTEREST SHE MAY HAVE IN REFERENCE 
TO BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY OR AS A MARITAL 
ESTATE WOULD BE CONVEYED TO MY CLIENT, IF ANY. 
MR. CASTON: AS EXISTED JULY 1ST, 1990. 
MR. WALSH: LAST YEAR, JUDGE, AT THE TIME OF FILING OF THIS 
ACTION. 
13. On or about December 12, 1991, the Honorable John Rokich signed off on 
FINDINGS OF FACT prepared by Mr. Walsh, as found at 000121 of the Record as 
follows: (Note Exhibit A, attached in Addendum hereto) 
12. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 
acres in North Salt Lake which is in one parcel, and that the Plaintiff would be 
awarded both all of the parties interest as well as any individual interest that the 
Defendant may have had as of July 1, 1990, the approximate time of the filing of 
this action, of the parcel continuous to the 10.7 acre parcel as well as the parcel 
across the street, Plaintiff and Defendant's father shall jointly and equally 
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contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 acres. 
14. On the same day, December 12, 1991, Judge Rokich, signed off on the 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW prepared by Mr. Walsh, as found at page 000125 of the 
Record as follows: 
30. The Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
Plaintiff shall be awarded the two other parcels in North Salt Lake, whether it is in 
the joint names of the parties or the individual name of the Defendant. 
15. At the same time of signing off on the FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, the Court signed off on the DECREE OF DIVORCE 
prepared by Mr. Walsh as reflected at page 000132 of the Record. 
10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake. Specifically 
Plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the said parcels as well as any 
individual interest of the Defendant in the same, as of July 1, 1991. (sic) 
16. On or about December 18, 1991, Defendant, Shauna Costanzo's Counsel, 
Harry Caston, filed objections to the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
and DECREE OF DIVORCE, as prepared by Mr. Walsh, however, at no time did he 
object to any part of the various paragraphs quoted above. (Note the Record at page 
000135) (Note a true and correct copy of the same attached hereto as Exhibit B in the 
Addendum hereto) 
17. On or about November 16, 1992, Judge Rokich, signs off on the FINDINGS 
OF FACT, prepared by Mr. Harry Caston, as reflected at page 000208 of the Record as 
well as page 229 of the Record: (Note Exhibit C attached hereto in the Addendum) 
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12. The parties stipulate and agree that the Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 
acres in North Salt Lake which is in one parcel, and that the Plaintiff shall be 
awarded both all of the parties' interest as well as any individual interest that the 
defendant may have had as of July 1, 1990, the approximate time of the filing of 
this action, of the parcel continuous to the 10.7 acre parcel as well as the parcel 
across the street. Plaintiff and defendant's father shall jointly and equally 
contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 acres. 
18. At the same time that Judge Rokich, signed off on the FINDINGS OF FACT, 
as prepared by Mr. Caston, the Court also signed off on the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
as prepared by Mr. Caston, as reflected in the record at page 000233 and page 000212: 
10. Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the plaintiff 
shall be awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake, whether the same is in 
the joint names of the parties or the individual name of the Defendant. 
19. At the same that Judge Rokich signed off on the FINDINGS OF FACT and 
the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, the Court signed off on the AMENDED DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, as prepared by Harry Caston, as reflected at page 000240 of the record as 
well as page 000219 of the record, as follows: 
10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake. Specifically 
plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the said parcels as well as any 
individual interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991. (sic) 
20. At or about April 1, 1992, Harry Caston, filed an Affidavit re: Attorneys fees, 
as reflected at page 000145 of the Record: 
2. The above-referenced matter was filed as a divorce. The contested matters in 
this divorce included: Child custody, the valuation and distribution of the business 
known as Western States Coating and Painting, the valuation and division of real 
property including the real property that had been obtained by the parties through 
or with the Defendant's parents. . . . 
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3. On Tuesday, July 2, 1991, this matter was scheduled to come before the Court 
for trial. After discussions with the Court and settlement negotiations outside of 
the Court (which took the better part of the day), the parties reached a stipulation. 
The stipulation was read into the record. 
21. Notwithstanding the restraining order that Defendant's Counsel, Harry 
Caston, sought and obtained, that prohibited the parties from "jeopardizing any assets, 
including Western States Coating and Painting, without prior order of the Court or 
approval of opposing counsel" as noted in Statement of Facts #7 above, as reflected on 
page 000248 and also 000301 of the Record. Also the negotiations "which took the better 
part of the day" regarding the division of the real property in North Salt Lake and other 
issues. The Defendant without disclosing the fact that she had already conveyed the 
marital property consisting of 3.47 acres and 3.106 acres, to her sister Marcella Vincent, 
as reflected at pages 000254, 000255, 000306 and 000307 of the record, heavily 
negotiated and then openly entered into the subject stipulation that this same property that 
she conveyed to her sister, should be awarded to Plaintiff, David Costanzo. 
22. On or about July 8, 1993 has reflected in the record at 000245 when David 
Costanzo, Plaintiff learned that Defendant Shauna Costanzo had conveyed the two 
parcels that she had promised to Plaintiff, to her sister Marcella Vincent Plaintiff filed his 
VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, for the court to 
substitute the two parcels for a judgment for the fair market value of the same, as follows: 
(Note Exhibit D attached hereto in the Addendum) 
Comes now the Plaintiff, David Costanzo, by and through his Attorney, John 
Walsh, and complains and alleges against the above named Defendant, as follows: 
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1. That the Plaintiff filed for Divorce, on or about July 1, 1990. 
2. Shortly thereafter the Court entered on an order on or about August 27, 1990, 
prohibiting the parties from jeopardizing any assets of the parties without prior 
Court approval, or approval from opposing Counsel. A copy of the same is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. Based upon the foregoing the parties entered into a stipulation and agreement, 
calling for the Plaintiff to receive certain properties in North Salt Lake. A copy of 
the transcripts read into the record is attached hereto, as Exhibit B. 
4. Notwithstanding the express Court order prohibiting the Defendant from selling 
the property, as well as the express agreement made and entered into in open 
Court, the Defendant has sold the same and taken the benefits of the same as her 
sole and separate property. A copy of the said Deeds is attached hereto as Exhibit 
C. 
5. That at the time of the stipulation being read into the record, the Court found 
that the property was worth $20,000.00 (twenty thousand dollars) per acre. 
6. That by virtue of the foregoing the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the 
Defendant in the sum of $129,720.00. 
7. That in addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff was awarded one twelve gage 
Browning Shot Gun, as well as one twelve gage Remington Shot gun, together 
being worth about $1,000.00. 
8. Plaintiff has requested the said guns, but the Defendant has refused to give 
them to him, and has apparently given them to a family member. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the above named 
Defendant as follows: 
9. For an award in the sum of $130,720.00. 
10. For interest, court costs, etc. 
11. For a reasonable attorneys fees. 
12. For such other and additional relief as the Court finds fit and proper under the 
premises. 
Dated this 7th day of July, 1993. 
/s/ 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
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DAVID COSTANZO, being first duly sworn states that he has read the foregoing 
and understand the same, and states that the same is true and correct to the best of 
this knowledge, information and belief. 
Dated this 7th day of July, 1993. 
/s/ 
DAVID COSTANZO 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of July, 1993. 
/s/ 
Notary Public 
Residing at: Salt Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: April 1, 1994 
23. In the Amended Decree, it states that the Plaintiff David Costanzo should be 
awarded the subject property as of July 1, 1991, and should actually have been July 1, 
1990. As noted in the Transcript at page 000412, the parties stipulated that the 
typographical error should be changed, so that it would be July 1, 1990. 
THE COURT: Before — Mr. Caston, what is your position with respect to that 
1991 date of Decree? Are you arguing that was the right date, or was it — 
MR. CASTON: I believe it's 1990. I believe that is correct. 
THE COURT: All right. So the Decree should have been 1990. You just 
inadvertently — 1991. 
MR. CASTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
24. Then at page 000569 and following, is the statement by the Court from the 
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Bench at the time of ruling: 
The Court finds that the acknowledgment of both parties that paragraph 10 of the 
Decree, the date 1991 that appears in the last sentence was typographically in error and 
that it should be changed to July 1, 1990. The record also would indicate that none of the 
issues in this case were impacted in any way by that typographical error, and the Court 
would therefore enter an order correcting the Decree Nunc Pro Tunc, and it will read July 
1, 1990. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE CLAIM THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT AWARD 
THE TWO SUBJECT PARCELS TO THE PLAINTIFF IS WITHOUT 
MERIT AND NOT ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH 
It is absolutely clear in the record, that the Decree of Divorce, prepared by Harry 
Caston awarded the two subject parcels to the Plaintiff. 
Paragraph #10, of the Amended Decree of Divorce, which was prepared by Harry 
Caston states: 
#10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake. Specifically 
plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the said parcels as well as any 
individual interest of the Defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991. (sic) (Record 
at 000219) 
If there were any questions in anyone's mind about the two parcels being awarded 
to the Plaintiff, the FINDINGS OF FACT, again prepared by Mr. Caston, clearly 
indicates the same with perfect clarity: 
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#12. The parties stipulate and agree that the defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 
acres in North Salt Lake which is in one parcel, and that the plaintiff shall be 
awarded both all of the parties interest as well as any individual interest that they 
may have had as of July 1, 1990, the approximate time of the filing of this action, 
of the parcel continuous to the 10.7 acre parcel as well as the parcel across the 
street. Plaintiff and Defendant's father shall jointly and equally contribute to the 
removal of the tires on the said 10.7 acres. (Record at 000208) 
In addition thereto, the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, again prepared by Mr. Harry 
Caston, clearly indicate that the two parcels were to be awarded to the Plaintiff David 
Costanzo: 
#10. Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
plaintiff shall be awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake, whether the 
same is in the joint names of the parties or the individual name of the defendant. 
(Record at 000212) 
These FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, mirror those prepared by Mr. Walsh, and the same were not 
objected to by Mr. Caston, at any time: 
FINDING OF FACT: #12. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Defendant 
shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake which is in one parcel, and that 
the Plaintiff should be awarded both all of the parties interest as well as any 
individual interest that the Defendant may have had as of July 1, 1990, the 
approximate time of the filing of this action, of the parcel continuous to the 10.7 
acre parcel as well as the parcel across the street. Plaintiff and Defendant's father 
shall jointly and equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 
acres. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW: #30. The Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in 
North Salt Lake, and the Plaintiff shall be awarded the two other parcels in North 
Salt Lake, whether the same is in the joint names of the parties or the individual 
name of the Defendant. (Record at 000125) 
DECREE OF DIVORCE: #10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in 
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North Salt Lake, and the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in North 
Salt Lake. Specifically Plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interests in the said 
parcels as well as any individual interest of the Defendant in the same as of July 1, 
1991. (sic) (Record at 000132) 
Hence, according to the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, as prepared by Mr. Walsh, Plaintiff, David Costanzo was 
clearly, and unequivocably awarded the two parcels in North Salt Lake, other than the 
10.7 awarded to the Defendant. 
Appellant's own Counsel prepared his set of FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE, and they too 
clearly and unequivocably award to the Plaintiff the two parcels in North Salt Lake other 
than the 10.7 awarded to the Defendant. 
Moreover, what is absolutely without any question whatsoever, is that the "parties 
stipulated and agreed" that the property in North Salt Lake should be divided accordingly. 
Not only did they agree to the same, they agreed in open Court, with assistance of 
Counsel, before the Judge, and expressly on the record. 
On page 000183 of the Record is the stipulation of parties, being read into the 
record, by Harry Caston, in open Court, with the Judge present and all counsel and all 
parties present. 
There was some other property which, of course, the Defendant has claimed was 
not marital property. It is our agreement that should it be determined that there is 
a marital interest in the property other than the 10.7 acres and the residential 
property that it would go completely to the Plaintiff free and clear of any interest 
of the Defendant. 
Then on page 000185 of the Record, Mr. Walsh, again states that the parties agree 
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that the other two parcels are awarded to the Plaintiff: 
Mr. Walsh: There are in our view, Judge, two pieces of property, and I want to be 
clear on this one point; two pieces of property in addition to the 10.7 acres in 
North Salt Lake and the marital residence which my client claims there is an 
interest either in himself, the two of them, or in the Defendant by herself, and it's 
the agreement between the parties that whatever interest she may have in reference 
to both the individual capacity or as a marital estate would be conveyed to my 
client, if any. 
MR. CASTON: As existed July 1st, 1990. 
MR. WALSH: Last Year, Judge, at the time of filing of this action. 
It is significant to note that not only is Shauna Costanzo fully participating in the 
heavy negotiations regarding Plaintiff getting the two parcels in North Salt Lake, but so is 
her father Perry Vincent, as FINDING OF FACT #12 states: "Plaintiff and Defendant's 
father (Perry Vincent) shall jointly and equally contribute to the removal of the tires on 
the said 10.7 acres." 
Yet, all of the time that the parties are negotiating neither Shauna Costanzo, 
Defendant/Appellant herein, nor Perry Vincent her father, step forward and say, "Hey, by 
the way, Shauna does not have any interest in these two parcels, as she conveyed all of 
her interest by way of a warranty deed to her sister Marcella Vincent, back some 2 
months ago on April 25, 1991." 
As noted in Statement of Fact #20 Harry Caston in his Affidavit regarding 
attorneys fees stated at page 000145 of the Record: 
2. The above-referenced matter was filed as a divorce. The contested matters in 
this divorce included: child custody, the valuation and distribution of the business 
known as Western States Coating and Painting, the valuation and division of real 
-14-
property including the real property that had been obtained by the parties through 
or with the defendant parents . . . 
3. On Tuesday, July 2, 1991, this matter was scheduled to come before the Court 
for trial. After discussions with the Court and settlement negotiations outside the 
Court (which took the better part of the day), the parties reached a stipulation. The 
stipulation was read into the record. 
Appellant argues on page 18 and 19 of her brief, that the Plaintiff got what the 
Defendant or the both of them owned in the two parcels, if any, not that they agreed that 
he would own the parcels outright. 
However, this position is not supported by the evidence, as at page 000517 of the 
Transcript is the following with David Costanzo, testifying: 
Q. Stay focused on the "if any." Do you remember the negotiations, Shauna not 
knowing what was there? 
A. Very much so. 
Q. And therefore not willing to commit one way or the other regarding these two 
parcels because she didn't know what she had? 
A. Yes. 
Q. An do you remember in the negotiations you clearly knew what was there and 
that's why you hung out for those pieces? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. And do you recall if the idea was to protect her because she wasn't giving any 
warranties on time? 
A. That's right. 
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As a result, the "if any" provisions had noting to do with if they did or did not own 
the subject parcels outright, rather the "if any" provision only went to Shauna's 
willingness to grant a warranty deed verses a quit claim deed, as she did not know what 
she had. 
This is confirmed in the transcript at page 000443 with Mr. Costanzo on the stand: 
Q. I want you to focus on my question in reference to the language found in open 
court. 
Do you recall there being a time when Shauna didn't know what was there and so 
we phrased it in those terms? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Tell the Court about that quickly, please. 
A. We, you know, she was busy doing other things and she didn't really — I 
know we didn't keep her really abreast of any of it. We sat her down and said we 
want you together on the title. Here's a check. And we gave them a check, and 
that's it. 
Q. So Shauna wasn't abreast of things. So when it comes time to negotiate this 
parcel and what if any interest — "if any," why are we saying "if any" in the 
stipulation and the agreement process, Mr Costanzo? 
A. Because I don't think she knew what she had. 
Respondent, however, has very serious problems with the Argument One of the 
Appellant's Brief, as it appears to be a challenge as to what Judge Rokich did in 1991 and 
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1992, when he signed off on the two sets of FINDINGS OF FACT, and the two sets of 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and the DECREE OF DIVORCE, and the AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
This whole appeal stems from what Judge Bohling did in 1996, in 
awarding to the Plaintiff the $106,200.00 not what Judge Rokich did in 1991 and 1992. 
No one appealed the determination made by Judge Rokich, and even if they had 
this Court would not have jurisdiction over the same, as the appeal would be untimely. 
Therefore, how can the Appellant/Defendant claim that they have a problem with 
what Judge Rokich did in awarding to the Plaintiff the two parcels in North Salt Lake. 
Appellant/Defendant is attacking what Judge Rokich signed off on in the 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE, prepared by Harry Caston himself, which states 
clearly and unequivocably that Plaintiff was awarded the same: 
#10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake. Specifically 
plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the said parcels as well as any 
individual interest of the Defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991. (sic) (Record 
at 000219) 
Respondent submits that Appellant can not be heard to say that she does not like 
what the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE states, and challenge on appeal a ruling 
by Judge Bohling in 1996, and expect this Court in that effect to overrule Judge Rokich, 
when he signed off on the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE, in November of 1992. 
Of equal significance is the idea, that one is trying to use the "if any" language 
used by the parties in open Court to work a change in the AMENDED DECREE OF 
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DIVORCE. 
The stipulation being read into Court is, of course, interesting reading, but it in no 
way can impeach the actual Amended Decree of Divorce when the same is not challenged 
either by way of a Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment, nor a Rule 60(a) 
Motion to correct a Clerical Error, nor even a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside a 
Judgment, but rather for the first time on an appeal some four years after the fact, when 
appealing a decision by a subsequent Judge, who awarded a money judgment. 
Appellant is particularly precluded from attempting to create a different meaning 
to the language in the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE, than is express and 
unequivocal, when it is Mr. Harry Caston that prepared the subject document, and 
submitted the same to the Judge for signature in 1992. 
Respondent submits that the claim that FINDINGS OF FACT #2 is clearly 
erroneous, made by the Appellant is wholly without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
A simple test of placing the same back to back with the Amended Decree of 
Divorce will bear this out: 
FINDING OF FACT #2 signed off on by Judge Bohling in March of 1996 states: 
2. The pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared by Harry Caston of McKay, 
Burton and Thurman, Attorneys for Defendant, the Plaintiff David Costanzo, was 
awarded two parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 3.47 acres in 
North Salt Lake, and the Defendant was awarded a single parcel of 10.7 acres in 
North Salt Lake. 
Amended Decree of Divorce, signed off on by Judge Rokich in November of 
1992, states: 
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10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake, and the 
plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in North Salt Lake. Specifically 
plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the said parcels as well as any 
individual interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991. (sic) 
Respondent submits that the claim that the Amended Decree of Divorce, prepared 
and submitted by Harry Caston to Judge Rokich, who signed in November of 1992, does 
not establish that Finding of Fact #2, signed by Judge Bohling in 1996, to be clearly 
erroneous. 
Rather the same are absolutely consistent with each other and unequivocally 
establish that the two parcels were clearly awarded to the Plaintiff/Respondent. 
Respondent requests the Court to award him all of his costs and attorneys fees, 
generated on appeal in this matter, as this claim is wholly without any merit and not 
asserted in good faith. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE FINDING THAT SHE HAD ACTED 
IN BAD FAITH TO BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS IS WHOLLY WITHOUT 
MERIT AND NOT ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
The whole thrust of this argument is that since Shauna Costanzo did not know 
exactly what she owned, she was free to convey to her own sister the subject property as 
she was in the dark as to what interest she had in the same. 
Respondent submits that his argument is wholly without merit and not asserted in 
good faith, as Shauna Costanzo, conveyed the subject property to her own sister by way 
of a warranty deed. 
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This conveyance by Shauna Vincent Constanzo, to Marcella Vincent, her own 
sister, was with all of the guarantees of title and marketability known in law. 
Shauna conveys the property not only with good and sufficient title but with 
guarantees or warranties that the same is marketable. 
The law has not changed since at least 1953, as found in 57-1-12 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, which provided: 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a conveyance 
in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises herein named, 
together with all appurtenances, rights and privileges there unto belonging, with 
covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, that he is 
lawfully seized of the premises; that he has good right to convey the same; that he 
guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that 
the premises are free from all encumbrances, and that the grantor, his heirs and 
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will 
forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns 
against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be 
briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the land. 
Respondent respectfully submits that it is not a good faith argument to tell this 
Court or any Court I can convey property with a clouded title, when there is a restraining 
order preventing the same, because I really do not know exactly what is mine. 
Appellant would not give the Plaintiff a Warranty Deed, as evidenced in the 
Stipulation, but she did exactly that when she conveyed the same to her sister in April of 
1991. 
Furthermore, this restraining order was sought and obtained by her own counsel, 
and based upon sworn representations to the Court that he just might do, exactly what she 
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thereafter in fact did. 
Even had there been no restraining order preventing this, conveyance by the 
Defendant, the subject transfer on it face would violate the Utah Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, as found at 25-6-1 and following, as it was clearly a transfer to a member of 
her own family to do dirt to David Costanzo, who she was in the process of divorcing, 
and in the middle of slinging all kinds of mud, to get custody etc., of the minor children. 
It is important to contrast what she admittedly did here with what she had 
represented to the Court regarding the Restraining Order: 
a. In Statement of Fact #4, she states in the motion, " . . . and further that the 
Plaintiff be restrained from alienating, selling, transferring or disposing of any 
marital property . . . 
b. In Statement of Fact #4, she states in the actual Order to Show Cause, "7. That 
during the pendency of this action both parties should not be restrained from 
alienating, selling or transferring any marital property." 
c. The minute entry states, as reflected in Statement of Fact #6 above, "3. Both 
parties restrained from jeopardizing assets to also include business without prior 
order of the Court or written approval of the parties." 
d. The language in the Preliminary Injunction, prepared by Mr. Caston, as 
reflected in Statement of Facts #7, which states: "4. That both parties be 
restrained from jeopardizing any assets, including Western States Coating and 
Painting, without prior order of the Court or approval of opposing Counsel." 
Appellant actions in April of 1991, were not the first violation of the very 
restraining order she sought and obtained from the Court, as she had already taken the 
shot guns of the Plaintiff and sold them as noted in Finding of Fact #5 and #6. 
There she had done dirt to the Plaintiff, by taking his cherished rifles, that he had 
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had for quite some time, and then sells the same, knowing full well that they were not 
hers in the first place, and knowing that there was an express order preventing the same. 
Then come April 1991, in the continuing saga of doing dirt to David, she takes this 
property that he had worked so hard to obtain, and then paid for, and she gifts the same to 
her own sister, just to do him dirt. 
Now, she stands before this Court and suggests that the Finding that her 
negotiating some two months later, and bargaining for the position that Shauna will take 
the 10.7 acres, and in turn David can have the 3.106 acre parcel and also the 3.47 parcel, 
was not in bad faith, when she surely knew that she had conveyed away all of the parties 
interest just two months before to her own sister. 
One of the major problems that Mr. Caston has in arguing this position to the 
Court, is that he impeaches his own affidavit for attorneys fees. 
There he is explaining to the Court all of the time and effort that was expended 
negotiating, to get the parties to settle for Plaintiff getting the two parcels and the 
Defendant getting a much larger one, and therefore Harry Caston is entitled to all these 
attorneys fees, because of all of his time and effort. 
Then on Appeal, he has to answer, "Why are we spending so much time and effort 
on who should get the 3.106 acres and 3.47 acre parcels, if your client has already 
conveyed all of the same to her own sister some two months earlier. 
As this Court can see the whole picture, Mr. Costanzo, ends up paying a hefty 
attorneys fee to Mr. Caston, for all the fine work Mr. Caston did in working a solution to 
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the problems, and then in the end Mr. Costanzo does not even get the fruits of all the 
efforts of all involved, and yet ends up paying both his own counsel and Mr. Caston. 
Respondent submits that somehow there must be an adjustment to all of the costs 
and attorneys fees involved in the negotiations etc., as not only does the Appellant have 
unclean hands, she has filthy hands, as they got really dirty, by the dirt she did to David. 
Counsel, even now is taken back by the conniving game and sham perpetrated by 
the Appellant, as this Court will note that she had been pushing for Plaintiff to get all of 
this property, and then she would be paid one-half for the same in three (3) days from the 
date that the Decree was executed by the Court. 
However, when it comes time to settle in open Court, she has not transferred the 
10.7 acres to her sister some two months before, so she holds out to get that in the 
negotiations. 
It appears that she transferred the 3.47 parcel and the 3.106 parcel to her Sister 
Marcella Vincent on April 25, 1991. 
Then two months later she bargains for David Costanzo to take whatever interest 
the parties have in these two parcels so she can get the 10.7 parcel. 
As this Court can see from Statement of Fact #8, in March of 1991, she submits 
her financial declaration to the Court, which is considered a sworn statement. Therein 
she states as follows: 
The Plaintiff should be awarded the real property located in North Salt Lake, Utah, 
subject to Plaintiff paying Defendant one-half of the value of said interest which is 
to take place no later than three (3) days following the entry of the Decree of 
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Divorce. 
The next month she gives the subject property to her own sister. 
Then two months later, on July 2, 1991, she bargains for the 10.7 acre parcel, and 
stipulates the Plaintiff get the lots she has already given to her own sister. 
This deception is compounded as the agreement to accept the 10.7 parcel is not 
what she proposed in the financial declaration - hence a change of position in the actual 
settlement to do David dirt. 
One must ask, "Why didn't she convey the 10.7 acres to her sister Marcella in 
April?" 
Isn't it interesting that in July of 1991 she ends up with the 10.7 acres - the only 
parcel in North Salt Lake that she has not "gifted" to her own sister. 
What was absolutely clear to the lower Court was the fact that the 
Defendant/Appellant had mislead everyone involved in this case, when she negotiated a 
settlement for herself to end up with the 10.7 acres she had not gifted to her sister, and 
Plaintiff/Respondent ending up with the two parcels she had so gifted. 
At page 000570, the Court after addressing the violation of the restraining order 
when the Defendant/Appellant sold the Defendant's shotguns, stated as follows: 
The Court finds from the evidence that has been established that both of those 
tracts were in fact marital property. The Court bases that determination on the 
testimony of the Plaintiff, on the position taken by the Defendant in the divorce 
proceeding as reflected in the Affidavit and the Pleadings, and failure of any 
contrary testimony from the — from any other record owners of the property, be 
they Diane Vincent or Perry Vincent. 
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Based on that, the Court finds that the action of the Defendant to convey her 
interest in that property was a violation of the restraining order entered by the 
Court, and that the settlement negotiations which were reflected in a settlement 
statement before the Court made in July of 1991 —excuse me . . . 
The Court will note for the record that Mr. Caston's statement at the hearing 
reflected there which very carefully refers the matter back to July 1st, 1990, would 
indicate that Mr. Caston was unaware that such a transaction had occurred, as was 
the case of Plaintiff in the case. And I think the Record should be clear that 
therefore the Court does not impute to Mr. Caston what it believes to be bad faith 
on the part of the Defendant making — it both transferring her interest in that 
property and at the same time negotiating a settlement which would appear to at 
least suggest that an - interested existed, or at least a potential interest existed. 
Now, on Appeal Mr. Caston in Argument #2, states that the finding by the Court 
that Shauna Vincent Costanzo had negotiated in bad faith is clearly erroneous. 
Respondent submits that the claim is wholly without merit and not asserted in 
good faith, and that he should be awarded all of his costs and attorneys fees for having to 
defend the same on appeal. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES BY THE LOWER COURT WAS 
WHOLLY APPROPRIATE 
Appellant's Argument #3, is but one single paragraph suggesting that the award of 
Attorneys fees is inappropriate. Due to the brevity of the same, and for clarity purposes, 
Respondent will restate the whole of the statement here: 
The plaintiff recognize the general rule that "an award of attorney's fees is 
appropriate only if authorized by statute or contract." Baldwin vs. Burton. 850 
P.2d 1188 (Utah, 1993) at 198. In the instant case, the court found that the 
Defendant had negotiated in bad faith. The defendant further recognizes that 
under 78-27-56 Utah Code Annotated, the court was authorized to award 
attorney's fees to the plaintiff based on its findings that the defendant had 
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negotiated in bad faith. As was argued above, the Court's finding that the 
defendant had acted in bad faith was based on the erroneous determination that the 
defendant knew what interest she had in the subject properties. The plaintiff 
testified that the defendant had no knowledge of the status of the properties, and 
was acting on behalf of others, and was in fact not kept abreast of the status of the 
property. As the finding that the Defendant was acting in bad faith is erroneous, 
the award of attorney's fees which appears to be based on bad faith becomes 
improper. 
Respondent respectfully submits that this claim is also wholly without merit and 
not asserted in good faith. 
First, it should be noted that the lower Court is authorized to award attorneys fees, 
when any one of four factors are present: (1) contract authorizing the same; (2) statute 
authorizing the same like the unlawful detainer statute; (3) outrageous conduct, like fraud, 
etc., which is the subject of the litigation and (4) claims or defenses which are without 
merit and not asserted in good faith, within the litigation itself. 
The Court could award attorneys fees on the basis that the claims and/or defenses 
of Shauna Costanzo in the trial before Judge Bohling were no asserted in good faith and 
were wholly without merit. Note Watkiss & Campbell vs. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 
(Utah, 1991) also Hermes Association vs. Parks Sportsman. 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991. 
Respondent submits that the lower Court surely could have awarded attorneys fees 
on the additional basis of contempt. Note Von Hake vs. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah, 
1988) also Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc. Vs. Labium. 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah, 1988). 
In this case there are two wholly independent basis for the award of attorneys 
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fees: 
(1) the Defendant /Appellant flagrantly and more than just one time, violated the 
restraining order, that she herself obtained from the Court, when she sold the Plaintiffs 
cherished shotguns, and again when she gifted over a hundred thousand dollars of real 
property to her own sister. 
(2) Then, even keeping her own counsel in the dark, deceptively got the Court 
order to read that she gets 10.7 acres free and clear from the Plaintiff/Respondent and he 
gets what she had already gifted to her own sister, by way of warranty deed. 
What is particularly troubling to the Respondent's Counsel on appeal is that Mr. 
Caston argues that since she did not know what she and her husband held exactly in the 
two parcels she gifted to her sister, she could convey whatever it was, notwithstanding 
the restraining order, and then not disclose the same to those fighting all day over the 
same. 
Counsel submits that the conduct of the Appellant is far more egregious that even 
the lower Court determined. 
As noted in the Record at page 000336, Plaintiff/Respondent filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, based upon the undisputed facts that there was a restraining 
order preventing the jeopardizing of the subject property when the property was gifted by 
the Defendant to her sister; the negotiating of the stipulation wherein Plaintiff gets these 
two parcels, etc. 
At page 000336, Shauna Vincent Costanzo, defeats the Motion for Partial 
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Summary Judgment, by representing to the court in an Affidavit that she had full and 
complete knowledge of the facts and then stating what they were. 
However, at the time of trial, and as argued by Mr. Caston on Appeal, Shauna 
Vincent Costanzo, was totally in the dark on these matters, and therefore can not be held 
responsible for gifting the marital property to her own sister. 
The Court seeing the whole picture, surely observes that the Plaintiff could have 
cut his losses, re: attorneys fees and costs, had the Defendant not originally deceived the 
Court as to her knowledge and the underlying facts in the subject Affidavit. 
As noted at page 000414 in the Transcript and following, Shauna Vincent 
Costanzo, does not know anything about the subject properties, or how and when they 
were acquired, etc. 
However, to defeat the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment she states under 
oath, the exact opposite. 
What is particularly disturbing to Counsel for the Respondent is how is the 
Respondent made truly whole for the continued deception by the Appellant. 
Respondent ended up paying his own counsel for the battle that went on in the hall 
on July 2, 1991, regarding who is going to get these two parcels. 
Respondent ended up paying Mr. Caston for his time and efforts for the same 
battle. 
Respondent ended up paying his own counsel to prove that what was stated in the 
Affidavit by the Defendant, at page 000336 was a total scam. 
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Now, Respondent is on appeal having to pay counsel to reply to the claim that 
Defendant should not have to pay just a part of what he is out for her multiple deceptions. 
Although Respondent has not Cross Appealed the decision by the lower Court, this 
Court should consider a just and fair compensation to the Respondent to make him whole, 
in addition to the award of costs and attorneys fees on appeal. 
Furthermore, it is not just what she stated to the Court under oath, by way of the 
live testimony and this subject affidavit that is the basis for the award of attorneys fees. 
Actually it was something totally in addition thereto, found at page 000570 of the 
Transcript and following, as noted by the Court. 
As found by the lower court, Shauna Vincent Costanzo, had claimed both in her 
pleadings and in the Financial Declaration before the lower Court, that this gifted 
property to her own sister by way of warranty deed ,was claimed and represented to be 
marital property by the Appellant twice before in the file itself. 
After taking the position in the pleadings that the property was in fact marital 
property, and then again in the sworn statement within the Financial Declaration, she 
appears in Court and is confronted with the undisputed facts that she gifted the same to 
her own sister by way of warranty deed, and then states under oath it was not marital 
property after all on the one hand and on the other hand claims not to know anything 
about the same being marital property or not. 
Respondent submits that the claim that attorneys fees were inappropriate before 
the lower Court is wholly without merit and not asserted in good faith, and therefore he 
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hereby requests an award for all of his costs and attorneys fees, as well as such other and 
additional relief as this Court finds fit and proper under the premises. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE CLAIM THAT FINDING OF FACT #12 WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
FINDING OF FACT #12, states: 
#12 That there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the testimony 
given by the Plaintiff, regarding the parties interest, and therefore the Court finds 
as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake to be 
marital property, awarded to the Plaintiff in the subject Decree of Divorce. 
To fully appreciate the position of the Appellant, this Court needs to consider 
certain factors. 
On page 000570 of the Transcript, the lower Court Judge made the following 
observations and findings from the Bench, in addition to the subject FINDING OF 
FACT: 
The Court finds from the evidence that has been established that both of those 
tracts were in fact marital property. The Court bases that determination on the 
testimony of the Plaintiff, on the position taken by the Defendant in the divorce 
proceeding as reflected in the affidavit and the pleading, and failure of any 
contrary testimony from the — from any other record owners of the property be 
they Diana Vincent or Perry Vincent. 
It is important to note, why there is no evidence that contradicted the testimony o 
the Plaintiff, and that is the court disallowed the same. 
This matter had been set for trial as many as ten (10) times, and on each such 
occasion the Defendant had failed to produce their exhibits and the designation of their 
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witnesses, with the exception of the actual trial held on January 9, 1996. 
Plaintiff had served discovery requests asking for the exhibits and the designation 
of witnesses, and nothing had been produced until three (3) days before trial, which 
included the weekend. 
Plaintiff then at the outset of the trial on January 9, 1996, objected to the exhibits, 
etc., that had been served on him on Friday, preceding the trial set for Monday, 
following. 
The Court then, as stated in the transcript at page 000399, stated the following in 
reference to testimony etc., that was not disclosed timely and the ambush with the same 
on the Plaintiff for trial: 
The Court: The Court will grant the motion. I think it's inappropriate on the tenth 
setting for trial to seek to get information into the record that there has been a 
proper interrogatory prepared and there has been no response to it until a very late 
date, and I think it is on its face prejudicial. 
Hence, a quick overview of the transcript will show that in fact, only the parties 
testified. 
The appraisal of Jerry Webber was admitted into evidence, as the same came from 
Plaintiff not Defendant. 
In fact, Plaintiff reproduced a copy of the appraisal to the Defendant, and the 
Defendant stipulated to that coming into evidence without Jerry Webber taking the stand. 
Hence, other than the exhibits put in evidence by the Plaintiff, there in fact was no 
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other witnesses other than the parties, and only Plaintiffs exhibits were admitted into 
evidence. 
Perhaps at this point it is well to say, that as a matter of law there was "no 
testimony or other evidence that contradicted the testimony given by the Plaintiff 
regarding the parties interest in the 3.1 and 3.47 acre properties." 
However, factually and as a matter of evidence the same is true as well. 
There were only two witnesses that took the stand in the trial, the Defendant and 
the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs testimony will be discussed below. 
Beginning on page 000414 is the following, with Defendant, Shauna Costanzo 
testifying: 
Q. (By Mr. Walsh) The parcel down here is about 10.7 acres; is that correct? 
A. I guess. 
Q. You don't know? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Would you know any more about the other two parcels? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember when they were acquired? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember how they were acquired? 
A. No. 
Thereafter, and throughout the transcript Shauna Vincent Costanzo, expounded on 
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how she was not informed from the beginning and that David Costanzo would have to be 
the one to answer the questions, as she just did not know and/or could not remember. 
Throughout the transcript, David Costanzo, explained how it was that one-hundred 
per cent of the parcel with 3.106 acres and the parcel with 3.47 acres were marital 
property. (Note the record at pages 000439, 000440, 000441, 000442 and 000450) 
Regarding the acquisition of the 3.106 acre parcel, Plaintiff testified beginning at 
page 000467, as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Caston) Is this the document that you requested in order to tell you 
what date that parcel was purchased? 
A. Yes, Sir. '77. 
Q. Does that refresh your recollection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That would be July 17 of 1977? 
A. That was the day it was signed by Shauna, Yeah. 
Q. And did anyone else sign it? 
A. Richard Chamberlain and Frances Chamberlain and Diane Vincent. 
Q. And does that document reflect your recollection as to what the purchase price 
was? 
A. It says said Buyer shall agree to enter into possession and pay said described 
premises for the sum of $12,400.00. 
Q. So twelve — 
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A. $12,400.00. 
Q. And does this refresh your recollection as to what the down payment was? 
A. Un-huh. $5500. 
Q And it's your testimony that $5500 was paid by Perry? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
On page 000439 and following of the transcript, David Costanzo explains how his 
sand blasting company made the balance of the payments. 
He further explains how Perry Vincent in theory owned half of the sand blasting 
company, and so Plaintiff in theory made half of the balance of payments and Perry in 
theory made half of the balance of payments or in other words Plaintiff paid the sum of 
$3,450.00 because the sand blasting company paid $6,900.00 of the purchase price and 
the said company was half Plaintiffs and then Perry Vincent paid a total sum of $8,950.00 
because Perry Vincent paid the down payment of $5,500.00 and the company paid 
$6,900.00, and half of the company was Perry's. 
Then, on page 000440, Plaintiff testified without any contradiction from anyone 
that he paid to Perry Vincent the sum of between $12,000.00 and $13,000.00 to buy out 
his interest in this parcel, so that Perry Vincent could pay a critical debt to the I.R.S. 
Also note the transcript at page 000512 and following where a second time in the 
trial, Plaintiff, David Costanzo fully explained without any contradiction that the 3.106 
acre parcel was one-hundred per cent marital at the time of the filing of the Divorce 
action, and therefore should have been awarded to him one-hxmdred per cent according to 
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the stipulation, and then FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS and DECREE and then the 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Appellant submits that all of the references to how the Chamberlains in error 
delivered a deed at the same time that they signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract, is 
only misleading to this Court and only confuses the issues. 
This does not bear on any testimony by any party, and has noting to do with 
whether Plaintiff paid the full price for this lot. 
In reality, the Chamberlains (the parties predecessor-in-interest in the purchase of 
the 3.106 acre tract) should have withheld delivery of the warranty deed until the last 
payment was made. 
However, they delivered the deed to the purchasers at the same time that the 
uniform real estate contract was signed, at the very beginning of the business relationship, 
instead of at the end of the said relationship when the final payment was made and title to 
pass. 
That error on the part of the Chamberlains has absolutely nothing to do with this 
matter, as the parties ultimately made the final payment and the Chamberlains were 
satisfied, and the deal was closed. 
However, for Counsel to suggest that since a deed was delivered to the purchasers 
at the same time that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed, is evidence of 
anything is without merit, as the same is totally irrelevant to who paid the Chamberlains 
their money due, and what was the ultimate resolution between the Costanzos and the 
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Vincents. 
As to the acquisition of the 3.47 acre parcel, Plaintiff testified that this property 
was purchased from the Gordon Larson family, at page 000444 of the transcript. 
This parcel was originally 4.47 acres, however, Perry Vincent had a personal debt 
for attorneys fees, and he got David Costanzo to agree to convey the one acre to the 
Attorney for the personal debt of Perry Vincent. (Note the Record at 000439 and 
following.) 
At the time of splitting up, David Costanzo and Perry Vincent agreed that each 
would take one parcel and pay for the same and hereby become the owners of the same. 
(Note the transcript at 000446 and following) 
David Costanzo was to take the 3.47 parcel and pay for the same, and the same 
would thereafter be his. This he did, and hence the parcel of 3.47 acres were one-
hundred per cent marital, and was stipulated to by the parties to go completely to the 
Plaintiff herein. (Note the 000448.) 
As stated by David Costanzo at page 000448, he and Shauna then paid off the 
entire balance of the 3.47 parcel and hence one hundred per cent marital, and was 
stipulated to by the parties to go completely to the Plaintiff herein. (Note the 000448) 
As stated by David Costanzo at page 000448, he and Shauna then paid off the 
entire balance of the 3.47 parcel and hence one hundred percent of the same was marital. 
So we — the deal is struck and I begin making payments. Well, if you look into 
the records you will see that it was a year or two behind on payments on Parcel B. 
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(3.47 acre parcel) Over the course of a year or two I get parcel B paid off. So I 
fulfilled by end of the bargain which was for David — 
As to the acquisition of Parcel C, which was the 10.7 acre parcel, David Costanzo 
testified that while he performed as he and Perry had agreed, in the full and complete pay 
off for the 3.47 acre tract, Perry Vincent had not made a single payment on the 10.7 acre 
tract. (Note Record at 000449 and following) 
They receive a letter from an Attorney, (in this case it was from John Walsh who 
represented the Chamberlains at the time of foreclosure on the 10.7 acre tract) stating pay 
off the same, or the Chamberlains want the property back. (Note record at 000449 and 
following) 
Perry decided that he was not going to do so, and that David and Shauna Costanzo 
would, and so David and Shauna take out a loan and then paid off the 10.7 acre parcel 
completely, and the same belongs to them exclusively. (Note record at 000449 and 
following) 
Hence, it is absolutely clear from the record how all three parcels became one-
hundred per cent marital, and the subject of the division at the time of the stipulation on 
July 2, 1991. 
Therefore there is absolutely no basis to suggest to this Court that FINDING OF 
FACT #12 was clearly erroneous. 
This FINDING OF FACT states the following: 
There was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the testimony given by 
-37-
the Plaintiff, regarding the parties' interest, and therefore the Court finds as a 
matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake to be marital 
property, awarded to the Plaintiff in the subject Decree of Divorce. 
Therefore, the claim that somehow the testimony of Mr. Costanzo contradicted 
itself, because the Uniform Real Estate Contract called for payments and then title would 
pass, is wholly without any merit, as the Chamberlains delivered the deed at the time of 
the signing of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, when they should have held the same 
until the final payment was made. 
The reference to the Chamberlain's dealings is wholly irrelevant to the issue, of 
who paid for the subject parcels, and only causes confusion of the issues. 
Also, the reference to which corporation paid what, again is of no significance 
because the Corporations were wholly owned and operated by the parties, and whether 
the check came from Mr. Costanzo personal account or from the account of Western 
States Coating (wholly owned by the Costanzos) is immaterial and only misleading and 
confusing to this Court. 
Bottom line, Plaintiff paid for the subject parcels, one-hundred per cent, and there 
is no contrary evidence, and hence the claim that the subject FINDING OF FACT "is 
clearly erroneous" is wholly without any merit and not asserted in good faith. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS A MARITAL INTEREST 
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS IN FACT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS. 
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Respondent submits that the whole of Argument #5 by the Appellant is 
misleading, as Judge Bohling merely restated the prior two sets of FINDINGS OF FACT, 
two sets of CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, a DECREE OF DIVORCE and a AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
As noted above, one set of FINDINGS OF FACT was prepared by Mr. Walsh, and 
one set of FINDINGS OF FACT was prepared by Mr. Caston. One set of 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was prepared by Mr. Walsh, and one set of CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW was prepared by Mr. Caston. 
Finally, the DECREE OF DIVORCE was prepared by Mr. Walsh, and the 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE was prepared by Mr. Caston. 
Each set of FINDINGS OF FACTS, and each set of CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
and the DECREE OF DIVORCE and the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE, was 
fully executed by the Honorable John Rokich, and entered by the Court, in 1991 and 
1992. 
Judge Bohling merely restated the prior rulings by the Court, and hence Argument 
#5, that this was not supported by adequate Findings, is wholly without any merit. 
As noted above, no one appealed Judge Rokich's rulings in 1991 and 1992 and 
surely they are not before this Court at this time. 
If appellant does not like the FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, DECREE and 
AMENDED DECREE, entered by Judge John Rokich, they surely can not appeal Judge 
Bohlings "restatement of the same" and expect this Court to allow the appellate challenge 
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for something that was resolved back in 1992, with no Notice of Appeal, timely or 
untimely, etc. 
Even assuming that FINDING OF FACT #12, was not a restatement of the 
determinations stipulated to in front of Judge Rokich, the lower Court was absolutely 
correct with the said finding as noted above, as the record was "clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding" in favor of the Plaintiff. 
David Costanzo was the only one that testified that knew anything about the 
matter, and his testimony was clear, uncontroverted and capable of support only a finding 
in his behalf. Note Butler. Crockett and Walsh vs. Pinecrest Pipeline. 909 P.2d 225 
(Utah, 1995). 
Appellant wholly overlooks the fact that Shauna Costanzo conveyed to her sister, 
by way of warranty deed the property in question, with all of the guarantees as outlined 
above, yet argues in Argument #5, that "THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS 
A MARITAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS." 
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, is the fact that the lower Court did not 
make just the one isolated FINDING OF FACT #12 herein, rather the Court clearly 
outlined every material fact that lead to the only conclusion that could be reached. 
The other FINDINGS OF FACT, that conclusively established the marital interest 
include: (A true and correct copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
Judgement and Decree are attached hereto as Exhibit E in the Addendum) 
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#1. That the parties in the above entitled action were divorced on or about 
November 16, 1992, pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered and executed by the 
Honorable John Rokich, District Court Judge. 
#2. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared by Mr. Harry Caston of 
McKay, Burton and Thurman, Attorneys for Defendant, the Plaintiff David 
Costanzo, was awarded two parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 
3.47 acres in North Salt Lake, and the Defendant was awarded a single parcel of 
10.7 acres in North Salt Lake. 
#7. That sometime in the month of April, 1991, the Defendant signed two 
warranty deeds conveying her interest in the two parcels awarded to Plaintiff, 
referred to in paragraph #2 above, to the Defendant's mother and sister, without 
either disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise obtaining authorization from 
the Court. 
#9. That the defendant testified while on the stand during cross examination that 
her original pleadings stated that the property in North Salt Lake, should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff and that she be awarded one-half of the value of the same, 
with no mention that the property did not belong to the parties. 
#10. That the Defendant testified while on the stand during cross examination that 
her affidavit filed as the Financial Declaration of the Defendant, that the property 
in North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that she be awarded 
one-half of the value of the same with no mention that the property did not belong 
to the parties. 
#11. The Court finds that the statements made by the Defendant that the parties 
had no interest in the said property, is inconsistent with the pleadings filed by the 
Defendant, and inconsistent with the affidavit filed by the Defendant, prior to the 
granting of the subject divorce, and therefore the Court does not find her testimony 
regarding the parties interest in the subject property to be credible. 
#12. That there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the 
testimony given by the Plaintiff, regarding the parties interest, and therefore the 
Court finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt 
Lake to be marital property, awarded to the Plaintiff in the subject Decree of 
Divorce. 
Hence, should this Court determine that Judge Bohling did not merely restate 
Judge Rokich's prior ruling (compare Finding of Fact #2 above) then surely the additional 
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FINDINGS OF FACT set out all of the material facts that Judge Bohling found "to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion" was reached. 
Respondent submits that Appellant's claim that there are insufficient FINDINGS, 
is wholly without any merit, and not asserted in good faith. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
THE COURT DID NOT EXCEED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY 
Appellant's claim that there was no change of circumstances alleged or proved at 
the time of trial, and therefore the Court abused its discretion, is once again wholly 
without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
Plaintiffs claim was that the Defendant had deceived the Court and Counsel at the 
time of the stipulation, and had failed to disclose to the Court and Counsel that she had 
conveyed over a $100,000.00 in real property to her sister, just two months before the 
said settlement and wholly in violation of the restraining order, she had sought and 
obtained from the Court. 
It is absolutely clear that a Court sitting in equity, can substitute the two parcels 
for the fair market value of the same, since title had passed from the sister, Marcella 
Vincent to certain unknown record title owners, with one minor exception. 
The State Legislature, when it passed 30-3-5(3) expressly granted the Courts the 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes in orders as is reasonable and 
necessary: 
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(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, and for distribution, of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
It is abundantly clear, that the Plaintiff did not claim that there was a change of 
circumstances occurring after the stipulation was stated on the record, and the final 
papers drawn and executed by the Court, rather his claims, and the evidence supported 
the fact that the Defendant had deceived everyone, including her own counsel into the 
terms that Plaintiff would be awarded the two parcels, when she had in fact gifted the 
same to her sister, by way of warranty deed, some two months before. 
Hence, the claim that a "change of circumstances" was neither plead nor proved is 
wholly without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the facts are clear and uncontroverted. The parties stipulate on July 2, 
1991 that Plaintiff would be awarded the two parcels in North Salt Lake. Several final 
documents follow the subject stipulation, reflecting the stipulation, and the matter is put 
to rest. 
That is until it is time for the Defendant to give the Plaintiff the requisite deeds to 
close the final chapter in the relationship. 
Defendant can not do that, as she had already gifted the property, by way of 
warranty deed to her sister, in order to do dirt to David. 
The Court seeing only evidence that supports the same, substituted the two parcels 
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for the fair market value of the same, hence an award of $106,200.00 (including the two 
shot guns that were sold by the Defendant contrary to the restraining order she obtained.) 
This appeal is wholly without merit and not asserted in good faith and therefore 
this Court should sustain the judgment, etc., of the lower Court, and remand with 
instructions to award all costs and attorneys fees on appeal to the Plaintiff/Respondent, as 
well as such other and additional relief as the Court finds fit and proper under the 
premises. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 90-4902675DA 
Judge John Rokich 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Tuesday, July 2, 1991, at the hour of 9:30 A.M. before the 
Honorable John Rokich, District Court Judge, with the Plaintiff 
David Costanzo, appearing and represented by John Walsh, Attorney 
at Law, and the Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, appearing and 
represented by Harry Caston, of Mackay, Burton, and Thurman, 
Attorneys at Law, and the Court after hearing the stipulation of 
the parties being read into the record, and after taking testimony 
of the Plaintiff and now being fully advised in the premises, does 
hereby make and adopt the following 
A A A 4 A V 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant have both been 
actual and boni-fide residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, for a period in excess of three months immediately preceding 
the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
2. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant are husband and 
wife having been intermarried in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about the 25th day of April, 1974. 
3. That the following children have been born as issue 
of the said marriage: 
Mario Vincent Costanzo, born January 6, 1983. 
Celia Anne Costanzo, born May 3, 1985. 
4. That each of the parties is a fit and proper parent 
to be awarded custody in this matter, but by stipulation, the 
Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor 
children, subject to the very liberal and meaningful visitation 
with the minor children, by the Plaintiff, including but not 
limited to the following: 
Alternate Weekends: Friday 6:00 P.M. - Sunday 6:00 P.M. 
Midweek: Every Wednesday 5:30 P.M. until 8:30 P.M. 
Holidays: (a) Christmas - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 P.M. and continuing through 
one-half of the child's total Christmas school vacation. 
(b) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial 
parent to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 1992, 1994, 
eooiis 
etc.) Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6:00 P.M. until Sunday 
6:00 P.M. Non-custodial parent ot have Easter in odd years (1991, 
1993, 1995, etc.) Easter holiday is Friday 6:00 P.M. until Sunday 
6:00 P.M. 
(c) Other holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, Presidents1 Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, and 
Labor Day. These are to be alternated with the non-custodial 
parent to have visitation beginning 6:00 P.M. the day before the 
holiday until 6:00 P.M. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation 
and no changes should be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend schedule. 
Father's Day/Motherf s Day: As appropriate, 6:00 P.M. the day 
before until 6:00 P.M. the day of. 
Birthdays: One evening, 5:30 P.M. until 3:30 P.M. during the 
week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial parent's 
birthday. 
Extended Visitation: (a) Summer - 5 (five) weeks continuous, 
with written notice of dates provided to custodial Darent by May 
1st. Custodial parent to have alternate weekends, holiday, and 
phone visitation. 
(b) Year-Pvound School - 2 (two) week periods with 
written notice of dates to custodial parent at least 30 days prior 
to visitation. Custodial parent to have holiday and phone 
visitation. 
(c) Each parent shall be allowed two (2) weeks per 
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year uninterrupted possession of the children for purposes of 
vacation, provided the Scjue does not interfere with holiday 
visitation, per above. Each parent shall notify the other in 
writing of such two week period at least 30 (thirty) days in 
advance. 
Telephone: Reasonable, before 8:00 P.M. 
The parties stipulate and agree that on every Friday, the 
minor children are to go to the home of Darlene Costanzo, however 
the wishes of the minor children are to be considered in reference 
to this Friday visitation. 
5. The Court finds that if at any time either party were 
to interfere with the visitation, as spelled out above, for 
spurious reasons, the Court shall switch custody or reduce visita-
tion, as the Court determines appropriate, after hearing. 
6. That the Plaintiff is employed at Western States Coating, 
where he earns $3,500.00 per month, and the Defendant is gainfully 
employed at the Copy Man, wherein she earns $1,600.00 per month, 
and therefore child support should be established pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Support Schedules consistent with the above, which 
is $302.00 per month per child or $60^.00 total child support for 
both children. That upon the payment of the said child support the 
Plaintiff is entitled to one of the exemptions involving the minor 
children. 
7. Plaintiff shall maintain the minor children on his 
health and accident insurance policy through his employer, if the 
same is provided therein, and if the same is not provided through 
his employment, Plaintiff shall otherwise provide the said insurance, 
$00120 
and any premiums paid for the same, shall be deducted from the 
child support set out in paragraph #6 above. Any health care or 
dental care not covered by insurance shall be borne by the parties. 
8. The Plaintiff shall pay one-half of any work related 
child care costs, and the Defendants shall submit verification to the 
Plaintiff both of hours worked as well as hours that the children 
were at child care, and upon the said verification, the Plaintiff 
is then required to pay half of the same. 
9. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Plaintiff 
shall pay the sum of $300.00 per month as alimony. 
10. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Plaintiff 
shall be awarded all the parties right title and interest in the 
business known, as Western States Coating and Painting, Inc. 
11. The parties stipulated m d <• greed that the Defendant 
would be awarded all of the parties right, title, and interest 
in the home of the parties located at 1141 Capistrano Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness thereon, with 
the Defendant to release, hold harmless, and indemnify the Plaintiff 
for any debts including the mortgage(s) on the same, and that if 
at any time the Defendant becomes thirty (30) days or more behind 
in the payment(s) and subtract any payment made from his child 
support and/or alimony payment set out above. 
12. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Defendant 
shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake which is in 
one parcel, and that the Plaintiff would be awarded both all of the 
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parties interest as well as any individual interest that the Defendant 
may have had as of July 1, 1990, the approximate time of the filing 
of this action, of the parcel continuous to the 10.7 acre parcel as 
well as the parcel across the street. Plaintiff and Defendant's 
father shall jointly and equally contribute to the removal of the 
tires on the said 10.7 acres. 
13. The parties stipulated and agreed, that because of the 
disparity in the division of the business and property, the Plaintiff 
shall pay the sum of $35,000.00 to the Defendant, at the rate of 
$583.00 per month, with no interest. This is considered a business 
debt of Western States Coating and Painting, Inc. 
14. The parties stipulated and agreed, that the Plaintiff 
would be awarded the furniture, furnishings and equipment in his 
possession and any clothing or personal effects, and gifts as well 
as the complete bedroom set, including: black laquer queen head 
board, black laquer seven drawer dresser with mirror, black laquer 
upright armoire, black laquer desk with chair, and black laquer 2 
ea. two drawer end tables, less the box springs and mattress, as well 
as the Grandmother's Clock, or of furniture of the same value. 
15. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Defendant 
would be awarded the 1987 B.M.W., subject to the indebtedness 
thereon, including her auto insurance and she shall release, hold 
harmless and indemnify the Plaintiff for the said debt, and that 
at any time that she becomes thirty days late in the payment of the 
same, the Plaintiff shall be allowed to pay the same, and then 
subtract the said payment from the said child support and/or alimony 
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payments as outlined above. 
16. The Defendant is awarded the furniture, furnishings and 
equipment at the parties home at 1141 Capistrano Drive, including 
but not limited to her^watch, subject to the indebtedness thereon, 
and that at any time that she becomes thirty days late in the payment 
of the same, the Plaintiff shall be allowed to pay the same, and 
then subtract the said payment from the said child support and/or 
payments as outlined above. 
17. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Defendant 
shall pay the remaining balance to Merrill Norman for his appraisal 
of Western States Coating and Painting, Inc. 
IS. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Plaintiff 
shall carry life insurance, naming the minor children as the 
beneficiaries, in the sum equal to the child support totalled for 
the minor children. 
19. Plaintiff shall pay the remaining balance of the 
Defendant's attorneys fees, in the sum of $3,300.00. 
20. The parties have drawn apart, and their differences have 
become irreconcilable, and preclude a continuation of the parties 
marriage, and therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences, the same to be 
final and absolute on entry. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court now makes and 
adopts the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
21. That this Court has both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
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22. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce 
on the basis of irreconcilable differences with the same to be 
final and absolute on entry. 
23- Defendant is to be awarded the care, custody, and 
control of the parties minor children subject to very liberal and 
meaningful visitation in the Plaintiff, as outlined in the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. Based unon the finding by the Court that each of 
the parties is a fit and proper parent to be awarded custody of 
the minor children if either party were to interfere with the 
visitation as spelled out in the said Findings, for spurious reasons, 
the Court shall switch Custody or reduce visitation as the Court 
determines appropriate, after hearing. 
24. Plaintiff is to pay the sum of $302.00 per month per 
child, or a total of $604.00 as and for child support, less any 
amounts paid for premiums for insurance for the minor children of 
the parties. Plaintiff is entitled to one exemption involving the 
minor children. 
25. Plaintiff to provide health and accident insurance for 
the minor children as set out above. An}' health care or dental 
care not covered by insurance, shall be borne equally by the parties. 
26. Plaintiff is to pay one-half of work related child care, 
as outlined above. Plaintiff shall carry life insurance, naming 
the minor children as the beneficiaries, in a sum equal to the total 
child support owed until each reaches the age of 13 years of age. 
27. Plaintiff is to pay the sum of $300.00 per month as and 
for alimony. 
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23. Plaintiff shall be awarded all of the parties right, 
title and interest in the business known as Western States Coating 
and Painting, Inc. 
29. Defendant shall be awarded the parties home at 1141 
Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness 
thereon, and she is to pay, release, and hold harmless the Plaintiff 
regarding any debt associated therewith, and if at any time the 
Defendant falls 30 (thirty) days or more behind in the payment of 
the same, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to pay the same and subtract 
the same sum(s) from the child support or alimony ordered of the 
Plaintiff, as outlined above. 
30. The Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North 
Salt Lake, and the Plaintiff shall be awarded the two other parcels 
in North Salt Lake, whether the same is in the joint names of the 
parties or the individual name of the Defendant. 
31. Plaintiff and Defendant's father shall jointly and 
equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 
acres. 
32. The Plaintif shall pay to the Defendant the sum of 
$35,000.00 at the rate of $588.00 per month with no interest, from 
the business of WesternStates Coating and Painting, Inc. 
33. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the personal property 
in his possession., as well as any clothing, personal effects, or 
gifts, as well as the bedroom set, including the black laquer 
queen head board, black laquer seven drawer dresser with mirror, 
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black laquer upright annoire, black laquer desk with chair, black 
laquer 2 ea. two drawer end tables, less the box springs and 
mattress, as well as the Grandmother's Clock or of furniture of the 
same value. 
34. The Defendant shall be axrarded the B.M.W. and her 
watch each subject to the indebteaness thereon, and if at any time 
she-falls 30 (thirty) or more days behind in the Payment of tae 
same the Plaintiff at his option may go ahead and pay the same, 
and subtract the said payment from any child support or alimony 
payment as outlined above. Defendant is awarded all of the 
furnishing, equipment and fixtures located in the parties residence, 
not otherwise awarded to the Plaintiff. 
35. Defendant is to pay the remaining balance to Merrill 
Norman for his appraisal of Western States. 
36. Plaintiff shall pay the remaining balance of the 
Defendant's attorney's fees, in the sun of $3,303.00. 
Dated this /z^day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
0 0 ^ 1 2 « 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, to the Defendant, by mailing the same to HARRY CASTON, 1200 
KENNECOTT BUILDING, 10 EAST SOUTH TFJIPLE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 





ATTORNEY AT LAW #3371 ' j? .^„ J -
2319 SOUTH FOOTHILL DRIVE .' ' * <£ i-jjs— 
SUITE 270 ""*—-- - . • 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: (801) 467-9700 
DEC 1 2 m 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 





D e f e n d a n t . 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo —' d \ | ^ Z ) 0 > ' Q ) 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
C i v i l No. 90-4902675DA 
J u d g e J o h n Rokich 
-ooooOoooo-
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Tuesday, July 2, 1991, at the hour of 9:30 A.M. before the 
Honorable John Rokich, District Court Judge, with the Plaintiff 
David Costanzo, appearing and represented by John Walsh, 
Attorney at Law, and the Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, appearing 
and represented by Harry Caston, of McKay, Burton, and Thurman 
Attorneys at Law, and the Court after hearing the stipulation 
of the parties being read into the record, and after taking 
testimony of the Plaintiff, and after making and adopting its 
a f* A s o o 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and now being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby 
ORDER, ADJUDGE, and DECREE: 
1. That the Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of 
Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences and the 
same is to be final and absolute on entry. 
2. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the care, 
custody, and control of the parties minor children, subject 
to the very liberal and meaningful visitation in the Plaintiff, 
including but not limited to: 
Alternate Weekends: Friday 6:00 P.M. through 
Sunday 6:00 P.M. 
Midweek: Wednesdays, 5:30 P.M. until 8:30 P.M. 
Holidays: (a) Christmas - non-custodial parent to 
have Christmas day beginning at 1:00 P.M. and continuing 
through 1/2 of the child's total Christmas school vacation. 
(b) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial 
parent to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 1992, 1994, 
etc.) Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6:00 P.M. until Sunday 
6:00 P.M. Non-custodial parent to have Easter in odd years 
(1991, 1993, 1995, etc.) Easter holiday is Friday 6:00 P.M. 
until Sunday 6:00 P.M. 
(c) Other holidays - New Year's Day, 
Martin Luther King Day, Presidents1 Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, 
July 24th, and Labor Day. These are to be alternated, with the 
non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6:00 P.M. the 
day before the holiday until 6:00 P.M. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation 
and no changes should be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend schedule. 
Father's Day/Mother's Day: As appropriate, 6:00 P.M. 
the day before until 6:00 P.M. the day of. 
Birthdays: One evening, 5:30 P.M. until 8:30 P.M. 
during the week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial 
parent's birthday. 
Extended-Visitation: (a) Summer - five (5) weeks 
continuous, with written notice of dates provided to custodial 
parent by May 1st. Custodial parent to have alternate weekends, 
holiday and phone visitation. 
(b) Year-Round School - two (2) week periods, 
with written notice of dates to custodial parent at least 30 
days prior to visitation. Custodial parent to have holiday, 
and phone visitation. 
(c) Each parent shall be allowed two (2) weeks 
per year uninterrupted possession of the children for 
purposes of vacation, provided the same does not interfere with 
holiday visitation per above. Each parent shall notify the 
other in writing of such two week period at least 30 days in 
advance. 
Telephone: Pveasonable, before 8:00 P.M. 
The parties stipulate and agree that on every Friday, 
O0G130 
the minor children,, are to go to tl: le 1: lome :>f Darlene Costanzo, 
however, the wishes of the minor chil dren are to be considered 
i . i: ence t- : tl: i:i s Fi: :i ia} 
3- Should either par*:/, f^r spurious reasons, interfere 
with the said vlsi tatioii, the Court a ftex hearing, shall switch 
custody o t t l.i e mino r c h i 1 di: en o i: ] iiii :i t ;,; i s :i 1: a t i o i :i , a s 11: i e C • :> i ix: t: 
deems appropriat <. 
' ' biiajLi * * rz r S" " s * rnontn i e r 
. .d s u p p o r t . . . ., i • . *: . n p r mnr *:h 
' L , i ' : r : f f : s nereb T r awarded ^.u of 
c h i l d , - . 
Upon ! : c payment 
t: In e e 
by the , .ii, , . • 
orthodoni ~- ~ -
w. . . V * -3 Cl I I »-^  
i *_ ; - u c u : 
equal]v-
CM.Crtr J) L i1 i fc ^ 
s n a j . 
or :vT 
- subtracted fr%m :ne 
I 
.suranci, snal, . c borne 
li: *- - w - *• »* -v ^  f- w c n i. 9UPoc: • r the 
ma nor chil dren, UIILXI each reaches the age of eighteen years of 
Plaint . . 
W t r c a - :ar 
' l e r i aa i r 
^rs workea 
a i . o *Di>n *" : 
. T . C - h a I f .* f a r: v wo r k r e l a t e d ch i 1 d 
\ " : ; :^- 1 f i c a t i o n t o t h e 
.-. . . . n o u r s t h a t t h e cl: l i l d r e i :i 
: s.*: : • r . - r i f i c a t i >n, t h e P l a i n t i f f 
0001 
7. Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $300.00 as and for 
alimony to the Defendant. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded all of th€: parties right, 
title and interest in the business known as Western States Coating 
and Painting, Inc., as his sole and separate property. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded the parties home at 1141 
Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness 
theron, and to release, hold harmless, and indemnify the Plaintiff 
for the same, and at any time, should the Defendant fall 30 (thirty) 
days or more late in the payment of the same, the Plaintiff at his 
sole discretion may pay the same, and subtract the said monies 
paid from his monthly child support and/or alimony aforesaid. 
10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North 
Salt Lake, and the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two 
parcels in North Salt Lake. Specifically Plaintiff is awarded 
all of the joint interest in the said parcels as well as any 
individual interest of the Defendant in the same, as of July 1, 
1991. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant's father shall jointly and 
equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 
acres. 
12- Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $35,000.00 to the 
Defendant at the rate of $533.00 per month with no interest, and 
the same is to be paid by Western States Coating and Painting, 
Inc. 
CG0132 
in his possession as well as any clothing or personal effects 
ib wen ~" "r.r ! *• 1«-^*--N^T« ^ >" , including: black 
laquv-i ....en head h* uro .. ^_ . .. . ..rawer cii: essei: !:v iti 1 
mirror. \ a : aquer urr::::** -.rrk,,:,: ; ; i :;;, r desk with 
'
 ;
 * • . - less the box 
springs and mattress »..,..* ^ Grandmother -; _->ck or of 
furniture M t e ; arne value. 
each subject to tl le indebtedness ^tfuu diiu * i
 3 ' ^  -r^^c 
h^:i harmless, and indemnify r ^ -i n M : ^ f - * * r^ ^  < (>e same and :* 
a i n i i e o t i r i i I Mi Mi I I >-i: :i ts 
• ;•;_' s'i;c same, the Plaintiff at his s~*.e • ;: jcrc1 ;-n. mav ^ a f t ^ dtne, 
and subtract the monies paid from uio cn^u support and/ or „io 
al imony aforesaid. 
Defendant ! - awarded ^ rhtr otrsonaZ pr:rcrty of 
t'-- * warded LL. "-:*; Plain" :'~r ^ <^ 
Defendant shal.. na^ anc . s.l^se h. . * n dii» *. o~ s . and 
indemnify the Plaintiff for t.^.t remaining balance ^wed ~ > Herril 
N< )i ma> " ' * g dnu Painting, 
Inc 
1 7 P1 a a nt:i £f sha, 1 1 pay t:he i:emai nin." "a a n c e owed f o r 
D e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s , i i i the sum, of $ 3 , 0 . 
18, fSach •• irie s h a l l c o o p e r a t e and e x e c u t e a l l documents 
necesi jdi I lii J n() d.»« II! 1 li*k I mi mil i nidi I i < >r i • i uf !ln i V r r e e 
a s o u t l i n e d above 
000135 
Dated this _/_2--day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the Defendant, 
by mailing the same to HARRY CASTON, 1200 KENNECOTT BUILDING, 10 
EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84133, this lQth day of 
December, 1991. 




HARRY CASTON (4 009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 3 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 






NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
TO FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 90-4902675DA 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The defendant, Shauna Costanzo, by and through her attorney 
of record, hereby objects to the Decree of Divorce and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the plaintiff in the 
following particulars: 
1. In paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce it is indicated 
that the defendant will provide verification to the plaintiff of 
the hours she has worked and the hours the children were at child 
care. Upon receipt of said verification, the plaintiff would then 
pay one-half of the child care costs. This provision was not part 
of the parties1 Stipulation. The provision is impractical as the 
defendant is not employed in a position where she punches a clock, 
ft (l 0 1 * ~ 
2 
or where her employer could provide ver. ;: ication of her employ mei 1 c. 
"r;e tetendant jerks ' -:r The Copy Mar. . T' outside sales. There would 
liniirs that the defendant 
was working. 
2. Paragraph :: indicates that $583 -- Ticr.th ;^ t. 
The agreement «vas * «* * * plaintjri Pay :;\e deiendaj,; trie sur 
$3 5,00'^ -•-• * * + > ' - *•• - There was 
agr ee 
Paint inq. 1: : he defendant fears tnat t:*e p i a i r ^ r t * i , .  cease 
the ' -rr*-^  • '* ' -.-. u.uctLinys ana Painting ami. 
therefor^ _... . : , * . Maer responsible +"<^  tender * 
property settlemer - 1)\.$ property settlemer: .% i_ based user i • 
existed !;n^ ;J*< ; t,:^  hearing . .. ^ t r e i . The p..*., _..;; 
was awarded tK. :^  • =se~ r-* * - ,: \ it^rest : m e 
Ie: - • . . -
responsio.e * defendant : o: n t t opertv settlement, ut i .« 
business. 
. 3.. . Ii i Pa r agr apt i 
the complete bedroom set which would include the lacquer desk with 
chair. It was agreed that the plaint^rf r-? awarded the complete 
bedroom set; however , tl: ie blac] i 1 acquer ,:= .. . i cha11 is 11ot pan t 
3 
of that set. It was agreed that the plaintiff would be awarded the 
grandmother's clock or furniture of the same value. The defendant 
would agree that the plaintiff retain the black lacquer desk and 
chair in consideration of the defendant being awarded the grand-
mother's clock. 
4. In Paragraph 14 the plaintiff states that the defendant 
is awarded the BMW and her watch, each subject to the indebtedness 
thereon. It is true that the defendant was awarded said personal 
property. It is also true that the defendant is responsible for 
the debt on the BMW. The same cannot be said about the watch. The 
parties did not stipulate and agree that the defendant would be 
responsible for the debt on the watch. In fact, the watch was a 
gift from the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant is paying 
debts for gifts which she made to the plaintiff. Further, the 
watch was on a revolving account. The defendant believes that the 
watch has been paid for and that the plaintiff has made other 
purchases on this account. 
5. At the hearing defendant's counsel agreed to prepare the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
Plaintiff's counsel objected to this. As the plaintiff had agreed 
to pay defendant's attorney's fee, the plaintiff did not want to 
pay any additional fees incurred by the defendant in the drafting 
of the final documents. As the documents drafted the plaintiff do 
0 0 ?• i % ? 
i i :: t zioiiipc i: t: 
the defendant .\„:;. : 
incurred I n responding *~ 
DATED this
 z _ - ir 
iwarae.: 
the same, 
artornev sne ....s 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
BY. 
/ 
/ / r Oft^^ 
'Harry Caston 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I her ehy ce r t::i f;; , t l la !::: c i 1 t l le d a y ci) f D e c enib e r, ] 9 9 ] a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was niailed, postage prepaid,. 
to the following: 
John Walsh, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Cove Point Plaza, Suite 202 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 





HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 3 
Telephone: (801) 5 2 2 - 4 2 3 5 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE Of U TAH 
DAVID COSTANZO, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: Civil No. 904902675DA 
SHAUNA COSTANZO, : Judge John R. Rokich 
Def endai I t : 
The above-entit] ed matter came on reqularJy lnr I t M I n 
Tuesday , July 2, I  993 at the hour" 9:30 a in. before the Honorable 
John, R Roki :: h Third District Court Judge The plainti ff was 
present I i : person and represented by i: ,se] , Il ohi i Wa3 si: Til if,'! 
defendant was present in person and represented her by counsel, 
Barn, r\isfni in Mai cii ' \n9? the parties appeared before the 
Court on the defendant's objections i u i iii" r unainqb oi t<xc\ inn 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce as had been prepared 
iff 'Tin1 liu'iit iiiq line stipulation oi tiie 
parties being read into record, duel after taking testimony of 
the plaintiff, and having ruled oi i the defendant's objections to 
IT 
# 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, 
and now being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make and 
adopt the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiff and defendant are both actual and 
bonafide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have 
been for a period of more than three (3) months preceding the 
filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
2. That the parties were married on April 25, 1974 in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah and have been husband and wife since 
that time. 
3. That there were two (2) children born as issue of this 
marriage, to-wit: 
Mario Vincent Costanzo, DOB 1/6/83; 
Celia Anne Costanzo, DOB 5/3/85. 
4. That each of the parties is a fit and proper parent to be 
awarded custody in this matter but by stipulation the defendant is 
awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children subject 
to liberal and meaningful visitation with the minor children by the 
plaintiff, including but not limited to the following: 
Alternate Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m. 
Weekends: 
Midweek: Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
Holiday: (A) Christmas - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and 
3 
continuing through 1
 y 2 of the child's total 
Christmas school vacation. 
Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent 
TO have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 
etc) ; Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. 
until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial parent 
t,o have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 95, 
etc.); Easter holiday i s Friday 6 p.m. unti ] 
Sunday 6 p.m. 
Other holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 2 4th, and Labor Day. These are to 
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent 
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the 
holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over t~;e weekend 
visitation and no changes should be made to 
the regular rotation of the ' r^ .r~3t ;ng 
weekend schedule, 
As appropriate, 6 p m t h e d a y b e i < in: v u 11"t ;t I <» 
p.m. the day of. 
One evening, 5:39 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during 
the week of the child's birthday and the non-
custodial parent's birthday. 
(A) Summer 5 weeks continuous, with written 
notice of dated provided to custodial 
parent by May 1st. Custodial parent to 
have alternate weekends, holiday, and 
phone visitati on. 
(B) Year-Round school t* c • 2: week periods, 
with written notice of dates to custodial 
parent at least 30 days prior to 
visitation. Custodial parent to have 
ho] iday, and phone visitation. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks 
per year uninterrupted possession of the 
4 
children for purposes vacation, provided 
the same does not interfere with holiday 
visitation per above. Each parent shall 
notify the other in writing of such two 
week period at least 3 0 days in advance. 
Telephone: Reasonable, before 8 p.m. 
Other times as agreed. 
The parties stipulate and agree that on every Friday the minor 
children are to go to the home of Darlene Costanzo; however, the 
wishes of the minor children are to be considered in reference to 
this Friday visitation; further, that the plaintiff must be 
available during his visitation. 
5. The Court finds that if at any time either party 
interferes with the visitations for spurious reasons, the Court 
shall, after hearing, switch custody or reduce visitation. 
6. That the plaintiff is employed at Western States Coating 
& Painting, Inc, where he earns $3,500.00 per month. The defendant 
is employed at the Copy Man where she earns $1,600.00 per month. 
Therefore, child support should be established pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Support Schedules consistent with the above, which is 
$302.00 per month per child or $604.00 total child support for both 
children, and that upon payment of the said child support the 
plaintiff is entitled to one of the exemptions involving the minor 
children. 
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Plaintiff shall maintain *"n^  minor children on his health 
in I i n . i J i iii i i n p i \ ] i c > t::l: 1 i s emp ] c • > e :i : i I I 11 *• > 
provided therein, ai 1 :i If the same If not provided through nis 
employment, plaintiff shall otherwise provide the smid insurance. 
: i: til: le same shaJ 1 be diKl a c t e d f t on t::l: le c h i l d 
support s e t out i n p a r a g r a p h 6 a b o v e , Any h e a l t h c a r e or d e n t a l 
care?1 not covered! by i nsu'f'vinii e slhuii I I I H borne equa 1 1 y by f he 
part ies . 
.-• , .."..-:: •: r;hf';., i-f: ---: ;. : .-.• • work related 
with i paystub. 
The parties stipulate -*•- agree that- -• . plaintiff shall 
p c i > t I if.1 s u m i HI " i mi I I mi i | in i in nit In u , iiiu 1 1 i in in I i iin iii)1) 
The parties stipulate and agree that the plaintiff shall 
awarded a] 1 the parties' right, ti tie and Interest in the 
business know n a s Western Sta tes Coa I I 11 g £ I ""alnt:i i lg,, Inc« 
The part1es stipulate and agr ee that the defendant be 
awarded al"J ol t he p..i rt i esr r i qht „ title and interest i n the home 
n .. parties located at 2 1 11 Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, 
Utah :»abject * »* ndebtedness thereo: :,r the defendant to 
I f I  i mi i i n y iilHii'l' s, 
.i eluding the mortgage - le same, and that if at any time the 
defendant becomes thirty (30) days u*. «wi—>ehind in the payment of 
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said indebtedness, the plaintiff may, at his discretion, pay the 
sums and subtract the same from his child support and/or alimony 
payment set out above. 
12. The parties stipulate and agree that the defendant shall 
be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake which is in one 
parcel, and that the plaintiff shall be awarded both all of the 
parties' interest as well as any individual interest that the 
defendant may have had as of July 1, 1990, the approximate time of 
the filing of this action, of the parcel continuous to the 10.7 
acre parcel as well as the parcel across the street. Plaintiff and 
defendant's father shall jointly and equally contribute to the 
removal of the tires on the said 10.7 acres. 
13. The parties stipulate and agree that because of the 
disparity in the division of the business and property, the 
plaintiff shall pay the sum of $35,000.00 to the defendant at the 
rate of $588.00 per month with no interest. This debt is the 
obligation of the plaintiff, who personally guarantees the same 
although the debt may be paid through Western States Coating & 
Painting, Inc. 
14. The parties stipulate and agree that the plaintiff be 
awarded the personal property in his possession as well as any 
clothing or personal effects and gifts as well as the complete 
bedroom set, including: black lacquer queen head board, black 
7 
lacquer seven drawer dresser wi th m irror, black lacquer upright 
i ; :ii t::]l: 1 • :::::]: ic :i  i: , b] a :::1 :  ] acqi ler 2 = .a ::: 1: i b i. ; ::> 
drawer end tables, 1 ess the box springs and mattress, as we] 1 as 
the Grandmother's clock or of furniture of the same value. 
Tl: le parties stipulate and agree I .hat the del endant be 
awarded the 198 7 BMW subject to the i indebtedness thereon, and her 
watch tin1" in ndebt edne.ss thereon I b<-j pa id t hn p I a m nt m ft . 
any time slit! falls t h u ty (30) days or more .late in the paymen. -.  i 
the vehicle, the plaintiff at his sol e discretion may pay the same 
t l lie moi in Hi ciii: s p a :i d f:i:::i c m l i:i ::ii s 3hi ] ::i si ip pc ::i::i t ai id ::: i > 
a iiiiuKv a i o r e s a i d . 
1 7 , The defendant i s awarded the furniture, furnishings and 
equ J (Jiiieiill ml I In )>ai I u»t lniiiii «il I I I I i a p r I i amu Inn l v e . 
.18, The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e and a g r e e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l 
p a y , and r e l e a s e , holii h a r m l e s s and i n d e m n i f y t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r t h e 
r e m a i n i i lg LidLdiiu. iiiin-.'il I i lie I HI \\\\ dppLaibd 
Western States Coatinq & Painting, Inc. 
19. The parties stipulate and agree that |-he plaintiff shall 
pay the remaining bal ance owed for defendant's attorney's fees in 
the sum of $3,300'. 00. Although the defendant's remaining 
fees ai: e $ I 3 3 ef'it' $ 1 If I" 00 
for attorney's fees I ncurred through July 1991. 
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20. The parties stipulate and agree that the plaintiff shall 
maintain life insurance on his own life in a sum equal to the total 
monthly child support for the minor children until each reaches the 
age of eighteen years of age. 
21. The parties have drawn apart, and their differences have 
become irreconcilable and preclude a continuation of the parties' 
marriage, and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences, the same to 
become final upon entry. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this Court has personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
2. That the plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce on 
the basis of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final 
upon entry. 
3. Defendant is to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor children subject to liberal and meaningful 
visitation by the plaintiff as outlined in the foregoing Findings 
of Fact. Based upon the finding by the Court that each of the 
parties is a fit and proper parent to be awarded custody of the 
minor children if either party were to interfere with the 
9 
visitation, for spurious reasons, the Court shall switch custody or 
reduce visitation as the Court determines appropriate after 
hearing. 
4. Plaintiff is to pay the sum of $302.00 per month per 
child, or a total of $604.00 as and for child support, less any 
amounts paid for premiums for insurance for the minor children of 
the parties. Plaintiff is entitled to one (1) exemption involving 
the minor children. 
5. Plaintiff to provide health and accident insurance for 
the minor children as set out above. Any health care or dental 
care not covered by insurance shall be borne equally by the 
parties. 
6. Plaintiff is to pay one-half of work related child care 
as outlined above. Plaintiff shall carry life insurance, naming 
the minor children as the beneficiaries, in a sum equal to the 
total child support owed until each reaches the age of 18 years. 
7. Plaintiff is to pay the sum of $300.00 per month as and 
for alimony. 
8. Plaintiff shall be awarded all of the parties7 right, 
title and interest in the business known as Western States Coating 
& Painting, Inc. 
9. Defendant shall be awarded the parties' home at 1141 
Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness 
10 
thereon, and she is to pay, release and hold harmless the plaintiff 
regarding any debt associated therewith, and if at any time the 
defendant falls thirty (30) days or more behind in the payment the 
same, the plaintiff shall be entitled to pay the same and subtract 
the same sum(s) from the child support or alimony ordered of the 
plaintiff as outlined above. 
10. Defendant shall be awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt 
Lake, and the plaintiff shall be awarded the other two parcels in 
North Salt Lake, whether the same is in the joint names of the 
parties or the individual name of the defendant. 
11. Plaintiff and defendant's father shall jointly and 
equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 
acres. 
12. Plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of 
$35,000.00 at the rate of $588.00 per month. Although the 
plaintiff is personally obligated to pay this obligation, the 
payments may be made by Western States Coating & Painting. 
13. Plaintiff shall be awarded the personal property in his 
possession as well as any clothing, personal effects or gifts as 
well as the bedroom set, including the black lacquer queen head 
board, the black lacquer seven drawer dresser with mirror, the 
black lacquer upright armoire, the black lacquer desk with chair, 
the black lacquer 2 ea. two drawer end tables, less the box springs 
11 
and mattress, as well as the Grandmother's clock or of furniture of 
the same value. 
14. Defendant shall be awarded the BMW subject to the 
indebtedness thereon, and her watch. If at any time she falls 
thirty (30) days or more behind in the payment of the vehicle, the 
plaintiff at his option may pay the same and subtract said payment 
from any child support or alimony as outlined above. Defendant is 
awarded all of the furnishings, equipment and fixtures located in 
the parties' residence not otherwise awarded to the plaintiff. 
15. Defendant is to pay the remaining balance to Merrill 
Norman for his appraisal of Western States. 
16. Plaintiff shall pay the defendant's attorney's fees in 
the sum of $3,300.00. 
DATED this /& day of /tfp c'f wt , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
vJ^ iHN f?-. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
12 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Q^ day of f\l^ n f , 
1992 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was sent to John Walsh, Attorney for Plaintiff, 




HARRY CASTON (4009) 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 3 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
DEC i 7 1032 
iJvV-'i., w>: 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 






DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 904902675DA 
Judge John R. Rokich 
\Q-,QQ-q.Q-'?sOlc^^ 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
Tuesday, July 2, 1991, at the hour 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable 
John R. Rokich, Third District Court Judge. The plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by his counsel, John Walsh. The 
defendant was present in person and represented her by counsel, 
Harry Caston. On March 25, 1992 the parties appeared before the 
Court on the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. The Court, after 
hearing the stipulation of the parties being read into the record, 
and after taking testimony of the plaintiff, and having ruled on 
the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce, and after making and adopting its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and now being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
1. That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce 
on the basis of irreconcilable differences and the same is to be 
final upon entry. 
2. That the defendant is hereby awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties' minor children, subject to liberal and 
meaningful visitation in the plaintiff including, but not limited 
to: 




Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
(A) Christmas - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and 
continuing through 1/2 of the child7s total 
Christmas school vacation. 
(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 
etc) ; Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. 
until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial parent 
to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 95, 
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until 
Sunday 6 p.m. 
(C) Other holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. These are to 
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent 
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 









Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation and no changes should be made to 
the regular rotation of the alternating 
weekend schedule. 
As appropriate, 6 p.m. 
p.m. the day of. 
the day before until 6 
One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during 
the week of the child's birthday and the non-
custodial parent's birthday. 
(A) Summer - 5 weeks continuous, with written 
notice of dated provided to custodial 
parent by May 1st. Custodial parent to 
have alternate weekends, holiday, and 
phone visitation. 
(B) Year-Round school - two 2 week periods, 
with written notice of dates to custodial 
parent at least 3 0 days prior to 
visitation. Custodial parent to have 
holiday, and phone visitation. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks 
per year uninterrupted possession of the 
children for purposes vacation, provided 
the same does not interfere with holiday 
visitation per above. Each parent shall 
notify the other in writing of such two 
week period at least 30 days in advance. 
Reasonable, before 8 p.m. 
The parties stipulate and agree that on every Friday the minor 
children are to go to the home of Darlene Costanzo; however, the 
wishes of the minor children are to be considered in reference to 
this Friday visitation, further the plaintiff is to be available 
during his visitation. 
4 
3. Should either party, for spurious reasons, interfere with 
the said visitation, the Court shall, after hearing, switch custody 
of the minor children or limit visitation, as the Court deems 
appropriate, 
4. Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $302.00 per month per 
child for a total child support obligation of $604.00 per month. 
Upon the payment of the same, plaintiff is hereby awarded one of 
the exemptions involving the minor children. Any premiums paid by 
the plaintiff for health, accident, hospitalization, dental, 
orthodontic or eye care insurance shall be subtracted from the said 
$604.00 stated above. Any health of dental care provided the minor 
children, but not paid for by insurance, shall be borne equally by 
the parties. 
5. Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on his own life 
in a sum equal to the total monthly child support for the minor 
children until each reaches the age of eighteen years of age. 
6. Plaintiff shall pay one-half of any work related child 
care costs, and the defendant shall submit her paystubs to the 
plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $300.00 as and for alimony 
to the defendant. 
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8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded all of the parties' right, 
title and interest in the business known as Western States Coating 
& Painting, Inc., as his sole and separate property. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded the parties' home at 1141 
Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness 
thereon, and to release, hold harmless and indemnify the plaintiff 
for the same, and at any time should the defendant fall thirty (30) 
days or more late in the payment of the same, the plaintiff at his 
sole discretion may pay the same, and subtract the said monies from 
his monthly child support and/or alimony aforesaid. 
10. Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt 
Lake, and the plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in 
North Salt Lake. Specifically plaintiff is awarded all of the 
joint interest in the said parcels as well as any individual 
interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991. 
11. Plaintiff and defendant's father shall jointly and 
equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7 
acres. 
12. Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $35,000.00 to the 
defendant at the rate of $583.00 per month with no interest. The 
plaintiff personally guarantees the payment of the same. The 
payments may be made by Western States Coating & Painting. 
r* r» / o A A 
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13. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the personal property in his 
possession as well as any clothing or personal effects and gifts as 
well as the complete bedroom set, including: black lacquer queen 
head board, black lacquer seven drawer dresser with mirror, black 
lacquer upright armoire, black lacquer desk with chair, black 
lacquer 2 each two drawer end tables, less the box springs and 
mattress, as well as the Grandmother's clock or of furniture of the 
same value. 
14. Defendant is hereby awarded the BMW, subject to the 
indebtedness thereon, and her watch. If at any time she falls 
thirty (30) days or more late in the payments of the same, the 
plaintiff at his sole discretion may pay the same and subtract the 
monies paid from his child support and/or his alimony aforesaid. 
15. Defendant is awarded all other personal property of the 
parties not otherwise awarded to the plaintiff above. 
16. Defendant shall pay, and release, hold harmless and 
indemnify the plaintiff for the remaining balance owed to Merril 
Norman for his appraisal of Western States Coating & Painting, Inc. 
17. Plaintiff shall pay the defendant's attorney's fees in 
the sum of $3,3 00.00. 
7 
18. Each party shall cooperate and execute all documents 
necessary to bring about the terms and conditions of the Decree as 
outlined above. 
DATED this /£ day of /Vc t •( /yi he 199 ^i-
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN fa ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
18. Each party shall cooperate and execute all documents 
necessary to bring about the terms and conditions of the Decree as 
outlined above. 
DATED this day of 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the V I day of / 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John Walsh, Esquire 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
2319 South Foothill Drive 
Suite 270 





ATTCNREY AT LAW 
SUITE 2 70, 2319 FOOTHILL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CI1Y, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 467-9700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT CF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooooOooooo 
DAVID COSTANZO : VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 90-4902675 DA 
SHAUNA COSTANZO : _ 
> < v. <__ f 
Defendant. : 
oooooOooooo 
Comes now the Plaintiff, David Costanzo, by and through 
his Attorney, John Walsh, and complains and alleges against the 
above named Defendant, as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff filed for Divorce, on or about 
July 1, 1990. 
2. Shortly thereafter the Court entered an order on 
or about August 27, 1990, prohibiting the parties from jepardizing 
any assets of the-, parties without prior Court approval, or approva 




3. Based upon the foregoing the parties entered into 
a stipulation and agreement, calling for the Plaintiff to receive 
certain properties in North Salt Lake. A copy of trie transcript 
as read into the record is attached hereto, as Exhibit B. 
4. Notwithstanding the express Court order prohibiting 
the Defendant from selling the property, as well as the express 
agreement made and entered into in open Court, the Defendant has 
sold the same and taken the benefits of the same as her sole 
and separate property. A copy of the said Deeds is attached hereto 
as Exhibit C. 
5. That at the time of the stipulation being read into 
the record, the Court found that the property was worth $20,000.00 
(twenty thousand dollars) per acre. 
6. That by virtue of the foregoing the Plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment against the Defendant in the sum of 
$129,720,00. 
7. That in addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff 
was awarded one twelve gage Browning Shot Gun, as well as one* 
twelve gage Pemrjin^ton Shot Gun, together being worth about 
$1,000.00. 
8. Plaintiff has requested the Soid guns, but the Defendant 
has refused to give them to him, and has apparently given them 
to a family member. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
above named Defendant as follows: 
QQQ21* 
9. For en av/arc1 in the sum of $130,720.00. 
10. For interest, court costs, etc. 
11. For a reasonable attorneys fees. 
12. For such ottu-.r and additional relief as the Court 
finds fit and proper under the^pr^mises. 
1993. Dated this / ^ day of 
JOHN JjkLSn 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DAVID COSTANZO, being firth duly sworn states that he 
has read the foregoing and understands the same, and states that 
the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief. 
Dated this *7^ day of 




My Commission Expires 
v
 *' ^  .^  -i 
EXHIBIT A 
HARRY CASTCN (4 009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys fcr Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 3 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID C0STANZ0, : 
-. - D 
Plaintiff, : .' _ 
vs. : 
Civil No. 90-4902675DA 
SHAUNA COSTANZO, : 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. : 
On August 27, 1990, came on to be heard defendant's Order to 
Show Cause before the Honorable Michael S. Evans. The plaintiff 
appeared in person and through hie counccl of record, Jcnn Walsh. 
Defendant appeared in person and through her counsel cf record, 
Harry Caston. The Court having considered the arguments of counsel 
anJ Llits pl«aUiny& un file Lei. eiii, anv.1 cjood C4U54 ft ppe airing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The defendant to have temporary use and possession of the 
real property and home located at 1141 North Capistranu, Sail Lake 
City, Utah. 
0 0 0 2 -i 8 
2. That the plaintiff may remove personal effects and clothes 
from the marital residence provided he first provides a list to 
defendant'a oounocl. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable visitation with the 
parties' minor children, said visitation to consist of (a) alter-
nating weekends from G:00 p.m. on Friday through 6:00 p.m. on 
Sunday evening; (b) one week night every other week; and (c) every 
other redletter holiday. 
3. That plaintiff provide to defendant a copy of defendant's 
1989 income tax return, including W-2 statements. 
4. That both parties be restrained from jeopardizing any 
assets, including Western States Coatings & Painting, without prior 
order of the Court or approval of opposing counsel. 
5. Plaintiff is restrained from annoying, threatening or 
harassing the defendant-
6. The parties are to mutually agree upon a person to 
evaluate Western States Coatings & Painting. The evaluator 
specifically may not be a person or entity that has previously 
evaluated or appraised Western States Coatings & Painting, the cost 
of evaluator ;o be initially at the plaintiff's expense. The 
parties are to provide each ether with a list of two evaiuators. 
Should the parties not be able to agree on the evaluator, the Court 
will make the selection. 
!Ui 0 2 
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7. That based upon the plaintiff's gross monthly income f^ 
$3f250.00 and an imputed amount of income to the defendant in the 
amount of $830,00, the plaintiff is ordered tn pay child support 
in the sum of $583,00 per month. 
8. That the plaintiff pay to the defendant one-half of any 
work-related child care expenses, the defendant to provide 
verification of work-related child care expenses to the plaintiff 
on the 5th day of each month following the month the expenses were 
incurred. 
9. Defendant is awarded temporary alimony in the sum of 
$4 00.00 per month subject to review should the defendant become 
employed. 
10. Thar the defendant be responsible for the following debts 
and obligations: Western Mortgage, Mnunt.ainwest Savings, GMAC, 
Spiegel, and State Street VISA. 
11. That the plaintiff be required to pay the following debts 
and obligations. Wcinctockc, J. C. Penney, Safeco, Nordstrom, Dr. 
Kelly Mangrum, D.D.S., and any other debts not mentioned above. 
12. That the defendant not be awarded a temporary attorney!s 
fco at thic time. 
o o o;; j o 
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DATED this day of 1990 
RECOMMENDED: 
MICHAEL S. EVANS 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: BY THE COURT: 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
CASTON\COSTSH08.000 
JOHN H. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
0 ll 0 " 5 1 
£ i i V n X D J . l E> 
HAVE I LEFT ANYTHING OUT? 
THE COURT: MR. WALSH, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING 
TO ADD TO THE STIPULATION? 
MR. WALSH: JUDGE LET ME MAKE A C L A R I F I C A T I O N 
OR TWO, AND THEN I NEED TO TALK AND MAKE SURE WE'RE IN 
AGREEMENT ON A MATTER. 
THE HOUSE OF THE P A R T I E S LOCATED AT 1 1 4 1 
NORTH CAPISTRANO DRIVE HERE IN SALT LAKE WILL BE 
AWARDED COMPLETELY TO THE DEFENDANT H E R E I N , ALL R I G H T S , 
T I T L E AND I N T E R E S T IN THAT REGARD. THERE I S A MORTGAGE 
ON THAT P I E C E OF PROPERTY WHICH MY C L I E N T I S L I A B L E 
FOR. THE P A R T I E S ARE AGREEABLE THAT I F AT ANY TIME THE 
DEFENDANT EVER GETS MORE THAN 3 0 DAYS BEHIND ON THAT, 
OR ANY OTHER PAYMENT FOR WHICH HE I S I N D I V I D U A L L Y OR 
JOINTLY LIABLE STEMMING FROM T H I S D I V O R C E , HE CAN PAY 
THAT AND SUBTRACT THAT FROM THE CHILD SUPPORT OR 
ALIMONY FOR THE MONTH WHICH HE MAKES THE PAYMENT. 
MR. CASTON: THAT WAS OUR AGREEMENT. 
MR. WALSH: THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY WITH 
REFERENCE TO T H E - - WHEN WE SAY EQUAL VALUE, WE'RE NOT 
TALKING EQUAL VALUE OF THE BED SET AND VALUE ONLY WITH 
REFERENCE TO THE CLOCK ONLY. 
MR. CASTON: THAT I S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: ALL R I G H T . 


























PIECES OF PROPERTY, AND I WANT TO BE CLEAR ON THIS ONE 
POINT; TWO PIECES OF PROPERTY IN ADDITION TO THE 10.7 
ACRES IN NORTH SALT LAKE AND THE MARITAL RESIDENCE 
WHICH MY CLIENT CLAIMS THERE IS AN INTEREST EITHER IN 
HIMSELF, THE TWO OF THEM, OR IN THE DEFENDANT BY 
HERSELF; AND IT'S THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
THAT WHATEVER INTEREST SHE MAY HAVE IN REFERENCE TO 
BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY OR AS A MARITAL ESTATE 
WOULD BE CONVEYED TO MY CLIENT, IF ANY. 
MR. CASTON: AS EXISTED JULY 1ST, 1990. 
MR. WALSH: LAST YEAR, JUDGE, AT THE TIME OF 
FILING THIS ACTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WALSH: ONE LAST THING, JUDGE, IF I 
MIGHT. 
YOUR HONOR, THERE PRESENTLY IS IN EFFECT AN 
ORDER THAT ALLOWS MY CLIENT TO SEE THE CHILDREN EVERY 
WEDNESDAY. THE SCHEDULE THAT YOU HAVE HERE PROVIDES 
EVERY OTHER WEDNESDAY. 
THE COURT: WHATEVER YOU AGREE UPON. THAT'S 











WE ASK THAT THE CHILDREN BE 
ji i\ t\ 'i r 9 j W •• .. 0 o 
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ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2319 FOOTHILL DRIVE, SUITE 270 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 467-9700 By. 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 9 1996 
SAL l L M s uUwJ* Pf\-
DftJtutyCtorfc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 




SHAUNA COSTANZO, ; Civil No. 904902675DA 
Defendant. ; Judge William B. Bohling 
ooooooOoooooo 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Tuesday, January 9, 1995, at the hour of 9:30 A.M. before 
the Honorable William Bohling, District Court Judge, with the 
Plaintiff, David Costanzo, apDearing in person and represented 
by John Walsh, Attorney at Law, and the Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, 
appearing in person and represented by Harry Caston, of McKay, 
Burton & Thurman, Attorneys at Law, and the Court after hearing 
the testimony of the parties, the exhibits admitted into evidence, 
and then considering the arguments of Counsel, now for good cause 
appearing, does hereby make and adopt the following: 
0 o c n 7 « 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties in the above entitled action were 
divorced on or about November 16, 1992, pursuant to a Decree 
of Divorce entered and executed by the Honorable John Rokich, 
District Court Judge. 
2. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared 
by Mr. Harry Caston of McKay, Burton and Thurman, Attorneys 
for Defendant, the Plaintiff David Costanzo, was awarded two 
parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 3.47 acres 
in North Salt Lake, and the Defendant was awarded a single parcel 
of 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake. 
3. That shortly after the execution of the Decree of 
Divorce by the Court, the Plaintiff signed a deed, conveying 
all of his interest in the 10.7 acres to the Defendant. 
4. That shortly after the complaint was filed for 
Divorce, by the Plaintiff, the Defendant brought a motion for 
a restraining order, restraining the parties from jepardizing 
any assets of the parties without prior Court approval or approval 
of opposing counsel. 
5. Then in December of 1990, contrary to the above 
stated restraining order, the Defendant pawned two shot guns of 
the Plaintiff, which had a reasonable value of $1,000.00 total, 
without either disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise 
obtaining authorization from the Court. 
6. The Court finds that this was a direct violation of 
the said restraining order, and therefore the Plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 as the fair 
flfln <r *•' .-> 
market value of the said shot guns. 
7. That sometime in the month of April, 1991, the 
Defendant signed two warranty deeds conveying her interest 
in the two parcels awarded to Plaintiff, referred to in paragraph 
#2 above, to the Defendant's mother and sister, without either 
disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise obtaining 
authorization from the Court. 
8. The parties stipulated to the appraisal prepared 
by Jerry Webber, as being admitted into evidence, which showed 
the fair market value of the said two oarcels in 1994 to be 
$105,200.00. 
9. That the Defendant testified while on the stand 
during cross examination that her original pleadings stated 
that the property in North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff and that she be awarded one-half of the value of the same, 
with no mention that the property did not belong to the parties. 
10. That the Defendant testified while on the stand 
during cross examination that her affidavit filed as the 
Financial Declaration of the Defendant, that the pronerty in 
North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the "Plaintiff and that she 
be awarded one-half of the value of the same, with no mention that 
the property did not belong to the parties. 
11. The Court finds that the statements made by the 
Defendant that the parties had no interest in the said property, 
is inconsistent with the pleadings filed by the Defendant, and 
inconsistent with the affidavit filed by the Defendant, prior to 
the granting of the subject divorce, and therefore the Court does 
A A f\ ° !7 *> 
not find her testimony regarding the parties interest in the 
subject property to be credible. 
12. That there was no testimony or other evidence that 
contradicted the testimony given by the Plaintiff, regarding the 
parties interest, and therefore the Court finds as a matter of 
law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake 
to be marital property, awarded to the Plaintiff in the subject 
Decree of Divorce. 
13. That at the time of the stipulation being read 
into the record, the Court finds that the Defendant did not 
even disclose the transfers of the subject proDerty, referred 
to in paragraph #7 above, to her own Attorney, Harry Caston, as 
he stated in open Court that the parties interest was to be 
determined at the time of filing of the Divorce, in July of 1990. 
14. The Court finds that by virtue of the foregoing 
the Defendant did not negotiate in good faith when she agreed 
that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the 3.1 acres and the 
3.47 acres in the North Salt Lake, as of the time of filing of 
the complaint for divorce, when she had already transfered the 
said parcels in April of 1991. 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant agreed to transfer 
the parties interest in the said two parcels as existed in July, 
1990, without disclosing to the Plaintiff, his Counsel, Defendant 
Counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all of the 
parties interest two months earlier, to Defendant's mother and 
sister in violation of the restraining order that she sought 
and obtained from the Court, in August of 1990. 
n i* r. «* **" J 
16. The finds that the negotiations by the Defendant 
were therefore not only in bad faith, but that the transfer of 
the subject property to be direct violation of the restraining 
order obtained by the Defendant. 
17. The Court finds the fair market value of the two 
parcels of property, of 3.1 acres and 3.47 acres to be $105,200.00. 
18. The Court finds that the pawning of the shot guns 
and the transfer of the two parcels of property to be in direct 
violation of the restraining order of this Court, and therefore 
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $106,200.00 as well as a 
reasonable attorneys fee. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court now makes 
and adopts the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
19. That the Court has both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction in this matter. 
20. That the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the 
sum of $106,200.00 (one hundred six thousand two hundred dollars 
and no cents), costs in the amount of $769.75 and a reasonable 
attorneys fee. 
Dated this day of March, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW to the Defendant, by mailing the same to HARRY CASTON, 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, 600 KENNECOTT BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
84133, this J^ fjfday of March, 1996. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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STATE OF UTAH ~2-~2~0 
oooOooo 4-1'% 
ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE 





Defendant. ; Judge William B. Bohling 
oooooooOooooooo 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Tuesday, January 9, 1995, at the hour of 9:30 A.M. before 
the Honorable William Bohling, District Court Judge, with the 
Plaintiff, David Costanzo, appearing in Derson and represented 
by John Walsh, Attorney at Law, and the Defendant, Shauna Costanzo, 
appearing in person and represented by Harry Caston, of McKay, 
Burton & Thurman, Attorneys at Law, and the Court after hearing 
the testimony of the oarties, the exhibits admitted into evidence, 
and then considering the arguments of Counsel, and after making 
and adopting its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW does hereby 
ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE, that the Plaintiff is hereby 
granted judgment in the sum of $106,200 (one hundred six thousand 
C C C 2 7 7 
two hundred dollars and no cents); for costs in the sum of §169.75^  
and a reasonable attorneys fee of $5,150.00 all to bear interest 
at the maximum legal rate unuil paid. 
Dated this 2.8 day of March, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE to the 
Defendant, by mailing the same to HARRY CASTON, 10 EAST SOUTH 
TEMPLE, 600 KENNECOTT BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84133, this 
Ir^day of March, 1996. 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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